Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response

fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies
the whole buffer back to userspace:

buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size;

void *resp __free(kfree) =
kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
...
if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size))
return -EFAULT;

Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading
step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer:

err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0),
FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0,
USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN,
0, private->bInterfaceNumber,
step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size);
if (err < 0)
return err;

usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or
zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg()
returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short
transfer is accepted as success.

snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally:

buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL);
...
memcpy(data, buf, size);

Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged
and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each
validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from
kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512.

On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data
stage, s0 = s2 = 255:

# init_on_alloc off, no spray
step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255
000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01
010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff

# same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag
step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232

# identical run, init_on_alloc=1
step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0

# all three runs
step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62

a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address
ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is
exactly the step-0 region.

Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full
step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Published: 2026-09-11
Score: 4.5 Medium
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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Remediation

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History

Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-908
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

 cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate

Fri, 11 Sep 2026 23:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Title ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-11T19:42:33.789Z

Reserved: 2026-08-26T14:34:25.810Z

Link: CVE-2026-80970

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-11T20:19:03.090

Modified: 2026-09-11T20:19:03.090

Link: CVE-2026-80970

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-09-11T19:42:33Z

Links: CVE-2026-80970 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-12T03:30:08Z

Weaknesses