The Ueberauth.Strategy.Apple.Token.payload/2 function verifies the JWT signature of the callback id_token against Apple's JWKS but does not validate any registered claims. The iss, aud, exp, and iat claims are read from the token and passed on to Ueberauth.Strategy.Apple.handle_callback!/1, which derives the logged-in user's uid and email directly from the unvalidated sub claim.
An attacker who obtains any Apple-signed ID token bearing the victim's sub (via a captured expired token, or via an ID token issued to a sibling client in the same Apple developer team) can replay it against the vulnerable callback and be authenticated as the victim. The absent exp check makes stolen tokens usable indefinitely, and the absent aud check enables cross-application account takeover across clients that share an Apple developer team.
This issue affects ueberauth_apple: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.2.
Analysis
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ueberauth | ueberauth_apple | unaffected |
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| ueberauth | ueberauth_apple | unaffected |
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No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
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Tue, 14 Jul 2026 16:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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Tue, 14 Jul 2026 15:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in ueberauth ueberauth_apple allows account takeover via unvalidated ID token claims. The Ueberauth.Strategy.Apple.Token.payload/2 function verifies the JWT signature of the callback id_token against Apple's JWKS but does not validate any registered claims. The iss, aud, exp, and iat claims are read from the token and passed on to Ueberauth.Strategy.Apple.handle_callback!/1, which derives the logged-in user's uid and email directly from the unvalidated sub claim. An attacker who obtains any Apple-signed ID token bearing the victim's sub (via a captured expired token, or via an ID token issued to a sibling client in the same Apple developer team) can replay it against the vulnerable callback and be authenticated as the victim. The absent exp check makes stolen tokens usable indefinitely, and the absent aud check enables cross-application account takeover across clients that share an Apple developer team. This issue affects ueberauth_apple: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.2. | |
| Title | Missing ID token claim validation in ueberauth_apple allows account takeover | |
| First Time appeared |
Ueberauth
Ueberauth ueberauth Apple |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-290 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:ueberauth:ueberauth_apple:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Ueberauth
Ueberauth ueberauth Apple |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-14T15:56:51.387Z
Reserved: 2026-06-17T17:55:15.686Z
Link: CVE-2026-55954
Vulnrichment
Updated: 2026-07-14T15:56:48.746Z
NVD
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Redhat
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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