Description
Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Published: 2026-09-14
Score: 3.7 Low
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

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Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p nimiq-primitives: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof
History

Mon, 14 Sep 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Mon, 14 Sep 2026 21:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Title Nimiq: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof
Weaknesses CWE-125
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 3.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L'}


Subscriptions

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-14T20:07:10.225Z

Reserved: 2026-06-15T19:04:14.455Z

Link: CVE-2026-54542

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-09-14T19:20:58.932Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-14T16:17:12.377

Modified: 2026-09-14T20:16:46.453

Link: CVE-2026-54542

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses