Description
nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender's message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.
Published: 2026-06-18
Score: 8.7 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

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Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Mon, 22 Jun 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Thu, 18 Jun 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Hkuds
Hkuds nanobot
Vendors & Products Hkuds
Hkuds nanobot

Thu, 18 Jun 2026 19:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender's message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.
Title nanobot: Path traversal via unsanitized WhatsApp document fileName enables arbitrary file write
Weaknesses CWE-22
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-06-22T15:41:03.264Z

Reserved: 2026-05-22T18:47:27.755Z

Link: CVE-2026-48716

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-06-22T15:40:24.810Z

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-06-18T21:30:16Z

Weaknesses