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Tracking
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f | Dulwich doesn't sanitize commit subjects in `porcelain.format_patch` |
Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
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| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
threat_severity
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Thu, 11 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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Thu, 11 Jun 2026 10:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Jelmer
Jelmer dulwich |
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| Vendors & Products |
Jelmer
Jelmer dulwich |
Wed, 10 Jun 2026 22:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.24.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit's subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f"{i:04d}-{summary}.patch"). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. This is fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade to 1.2.5 or later. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git's format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to porcelain.format_patch can use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename; validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir; and/or pre-screen commits and refuse to format any whose subject's first line contains /, \, .., or other characters that are not safe on the target filesystem. | |
| Title | Dulwich doesn't sanitize commit subjects in `porcelain.format_patch` | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-11T12:42:40.209Z
Reserved: 2026-05-19T21:29:25.481Z
Link: CVE-2026-47712
Updated: 2026-06-11T12:41:33.222Z
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-06-10T23:16:48.650
Modified: 2026-06-11T15:21:07.370
Link: CVE-2026-47712
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-11T10:40:40Z
Github GHSA