Description
Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send.

Both default emails emit a link of the form `$base/login/$code`, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy (obtained from Dancer2's request->base function). A POST to /login carrying submit_reset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender's choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls create_user with email_welcome set.

Through 0.711 the handlers read `request->uri_base` and `request->base` directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uri_base configuration key that defaults to the untrusted `request->uri_base` when unset.

The default configuration with reset_password_handler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender's host, which is enough to take over the account.
Published: 2026-08-15
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.

Remediation

Vendor Workaround

No fixed release is available. In 0.712 and later, set the uri_base configuration key to the application's own base URL; otherwise reject requests whose host is not an expected application hostname, including X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Sat, 15 Aug 2026 13:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send. Both default emails emit a link of the form `$base/login/$code`, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy (obtained from Dancer2's request->base function). A POST to /login carrying submit_reset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender's choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls create_user with email_welcome set. Through 0.711 the handlers read `request->uri_base` and `request->base` directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uri_base configuration key that defaults to the untrusted `request->uri_base` when unset. The default configuration with reset_password_handler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender's host, which is enough to take over the account.
Title Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send
Weaknesses CWE-640
References

Subscriptions

No data.

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: CPANSec

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-15T13:25:26.318Z

Reserved: 2026-07-14T01:03:59.438Z

Link: CVE-2026-15689

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-15T14:17:06.480

Modified: 2026-08-15T14:17:06.480

Link: CVE-2026-15689

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses