Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
No advisories yet.
Sat, 26 Sep 2026 13:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | GitPython before 3.1.62 does not validate the `path` field read from an untrusted .gitmodules file when updating submodules. While a prior fix (GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) added Submodule._validated_name() to constrain the `name` field, and GitPython's own containment guard Submodule._to_relative_path() is applied in add() and move(), Submodule.update() derives the absolute checkout location from the raw `path` value without that guard. A .gitmodules entry containing directory traversal components (e.g., path = ../../../tmp/escaped) can therefore cause directories to be created via os.makedirs() outside the repository working tree, populated from the submodule URL on the clone path, and removed via shutil.rmtree() when force_remove is used. Exploitation requires an application flow that updates submodules at a non-HEAD commit (such as a historical-commit API); the common clone-then-update flow re-derives the path from a canonical tree lookup and is not affected. The issue is fixed in GitPython 3.1.62. | |
| Title | GitPython before 3.1.62 Path Traversal via gitmodules path | |
| First Time appeared |
Gitpython Project
Gitpython Project gitpython |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:gitpython_project:gitpython:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Gitpython Project
Gitpython Project gitpython |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: VulnCheck
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-26T13:23:48.759Z
Reserved: 2026-09-26T02:37:41.037Z
Link: CVE-2026-100689
No data.
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.