Export limit exceeded: 400210 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (400210 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-19445 | 1 Python | 1 Cpython | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its sni_callback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected. Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets sni_callback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18825 | 1 Antono | 1 Connect-cors | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| An Origin Validation Error in the middleware of the connect-xcors npm package allows an attacker to bypass origin verification and perform a cross domain authenticated request. | ||||
| CVE-2026-18413 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-09-30 | 7.8 High |
| The ADC API requires each driver to reject a sampling sequence whose destination buffer is too small: the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h documents that "the driver must ensure that samples are not written beyond the limit and it must return an error if the buffer turns out to be not large enough". The NXP MCUX LPADC driver did not honour that contract. mcux_lpadc_start_read() in drivers/adc/adc_mcux_lpadc.c performed no buffer-size check at all before assigning data->buffer = sequence->buffer. Each completed conversion then stores one 16-bit sample per enabled channel per sampling round through an unbounded *data->buffer++: in mcux_lpadc_isr() for interrupt-driven builds, and in mcux_lpadc_dma_callback() for DMA-driven builds on releases that have the DMA path. A sequence selecting two channels with a two-byte buffer, for example, has its second sample written past the end of the buffer. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE, adc_read() and adc_read_async() are system calls. The handler in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c copies the sequence in from user memory, verifies only that [buffer, buffer + buffer_size) is writable by the calling thread, and rejects a user-supplied options->callback; it deliberately leaves the size arithmetic to the driver. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to an LPADC device object therefore fully controls channels, buffer, buffer_size and options->extra_samplings, and can request far more samples than its buffer can hold: up to channels * 65536 samples into a two-byte buffer, since the sample pointer is only rewound on a repeat sampling, never on the extra samplings of a sequence. The resulting stores are performed by the driver in kernel mode (in the ADC interrupt handler or the DMA completion callback), where the MPU does not restrict the thread's memory domain, so the write walks linearly out of the user partition and into adjacent memory such as other partitions, kernel data or thread stacks. The impact is kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, a plausible privilege-escalation and denial-of-service primitive from an unprivileged user-mode thread. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are affected only as a caller-side robustness defect, since the application itself supplies the buffer. The fix calls the new shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() in drivers/adc/adc_common.c from mcux_lpadc_start_read(). The helper computes active_channels sizeof(uint16_t) (1 + extra_samplings) and returns -ENOMEM before any sampling is started. | ||||
| CVE-2026-16513 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-09-30 | 7.8 High |
| The userspace verifier z_vrfy_rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c (subsys/rtio/rtio_handlers.c before v4.3.0) validated the RTIO object handle and the sqes input array, but not the handle out-parameter. On the first loop iteration it executed *handle = sqe, storing the kernel address of the newly acquired submission-queue entry through a pointer taken verbatim from user mode, with no K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE check in front of it. Any user-mode thread that has been granted a struct rtio kernel object can invoke the syscall with an arbitrary address in handle. That is the ordinary way an unprivileged thread uses the RTIO API, for example via sensor_read_async_mempool() or the async ADC helpers, which call rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() internally. The store happens in supervisor mode before any submission-entry validation, so it fires regardless of whether the SQE contents are subsequently rejected. Only builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_RTIO are affected; without CONFIG_USERSPACE the verifier is not compiled and the caller is already privileged. The write address is fully attacker-chosen and the written value is a pointer into the caller's own RTIO ring, whose contents the caller controls (the following *sqe = sqes[i] copies an attacker-supplied struct rtio_sqe into that slot). This yields a write-what-where primitive placing a pointer to attacker-controlled data at any kernel address, sufficient to corrupt kernel function pointers, thread structures, or memory-domain partition tables, and thus to escalate from user mode to kernel mode, defeating the isolation boundary CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to enforce. At minimum it is a reliable kernel memory-corruption and crash primitive. The reporter reproduced the write on qemu_x86: a K_USER thread changed a supervisor global from NULL to a live kernel SQE pointer. The fix adds K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(handle, sizeof(*handle)) (guarded by the existing optional-NULL semantics) before the loop, so the destination must lie in the calling thread's writable memory domain or the thread is terminated by K_OOPS. The neighbouring verifier z_vrfy_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer(), which checked its buff/buff_len out-parameters only for read although the implementation writes through them, was hardened separately by bea93400138 ("rtio: syscalls: validate output params as writable"); that residual was materially weaker, since a read check still confines the target to the caller's own memory domain. | ||||
| CVE-2026-103049 | 1 Wikimedia | 1 Mediawiki-cargo Extension | 2026-09-30 | 6.1 Medium |
| Improper neutralization of input during web page generation ('cross-site scripting') vulnerability in The Wikimedia Foundation Mediawiki - Cargo extension allows Reflected XSS. This issue affects Mediawiki - Cargo extension: before 1.46.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-103047 | 1 Wikimedia | 1 Mediawiki - Centralauth Extension | 2026-09-30 | 6.1 Medium |
| Improper neutralization of input during web page generation ('cross-site scripting') vulnerability in The Wikimedia Foundation Mediawiki - CentralAuth extension allows Stored XSS. This issue affects Mediawiki - CentralAuth extension: before 1.46.1, 1.45.5, 1.43.10. | ||||
| CVE-2026-103045 | 1 The Wikimedia Foundation | 1 Mediawiki - Refreshed Skin | 2026-09-30 | 6.1 Medium |
| Improper neutralization of input during web page generation ('cross-site scripting') vulnerability in The Wikimedia Foundation Mediawiki - Refreshed skin allows Stored XSS. This issue affects Mediawiki - Refreshed skin: before 1.46.1, 1.45.5, 1.43.10. | ||||
| CVE-2026-103000 | 2026-09-30 | N/A | ||
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.19.0, a crafted PDF can provide unusually large alphabetical page-label values that cause pypdf/_page_labels.py to generate strings beyond a reasonable page-label length when an application retrieves document page labels, consuming excessive memory and potentially making the application unavailable. This issue is fixed in version 6.19.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102998 | 2026-09-30 | N/A | ||
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.19.0, a crafted PDF with form field values can cause pypdf/generic/_appearance_stream.py appearance-stream generation to repeat invariant selection-data work inside a loop when an application updates fields with flattening enabled, resulting in excessive runtimes and application unavailability. This issue is fixed in version 6.19.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102996 | 2026-09-30 | N/A | ||
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.18.1, a crafted PDF can provide a TrueType or Type1 simple font with an unusually large /Widths array, causing pypdf/_font.py Font._collect_tt_t1_character_widths to process entries beyond the 256 character codes meaningful for a simple font and consume excessive memory during operations such as text extraction. This issue is fixed in version 6.18.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102994 | 2026-09-30 | N/A | ||
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.18.0, a crafted PDF containing indirect-object identifiers or generation-number tokens that continue for a long time without whitespace can cause pypdf/_reader.py and pypdf/generic/_base.py to scan excessive input through read_until_whitespace, resulting in long runtimes and application unavailability. This issue is fixed in version 6.18.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102992 | 2026-09-30 | N/A | ||
| piscina is a node.js worker pool implementation. Prior to 4.9.4, 5.3.2, and 6.0.0-rc.5, Piscina stores ThreadPool.options in src/index.ts as a plain object that inherits from Object.prototype. Applications with a separate prototype-pollution primitive can therefore supply inherited values for security-sensitive options that do not have own defaults. An inherited execArgv value is passed to the Node.js Worker constructor and can preload attacker-controlled code in worker threads, an inherited loadBalancer function can execute during task scheduling, and inherited env values can alter worker environments. This issue is fixed in versions 4.9.4, 5.3.2, and 6.0.0-rc.5. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102990 | 2026-09-30 | N/A | ||
| basic-ftp is an FTP client for Node.js. Prior to 6.2.1, Client.list() can be forced by a malicious or compromised FTP server to spend quadratic CPU time parsing a directory listing because the RE_LINE expression in src/parseListUnix.ts backtracks across adjacent variable-length owner and group fields when a long Unix-style line has a valid prefix but cannot satisfy the later size and date fields. parseList() selects a parser from the last nonblank line and then applies it to every line, so a normal final line can select the Unix parser while an earlier crafted line blocks the Node.js event loop and freezes the process. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102904 | 1 Jupyter | 1 Jupyterlab | 2026-09-30 | 5.4 Medium |
| JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From JupyterLab 4.0.0 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, the PyPI Extension Manager uninstall request reaches ExtensionHandler.post, which validates extension names for installation but passes uninstall names to PyPIExtensionManager.uninstall and python -m pip uninstall without rejecting option-like values. The security impact requires that the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, the account can call the extension API, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts; otherwise the user can already read files and make outbound requests directly. An authenticated user with extension API access can supply a pip requirements option to make the server read a local file or fetch an internal URL, and reflected parse errors can return the first unparsable line or response content. A pip log option can also create or corrupt a chosen path with pip-generated log text, but the requester cannot select an arbitrary disclosed line or arbitrary file content, and the injection does not add code execution or availability impact beyond ordinary package removal. This issue is fixed in JupyterLab 4.5.11 and 4.6.4. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102828 | 1 Steveukx | 1 Git-js | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| simple-git, an interface for running git commands in any node.js application, enables applications to execute Git operations from JavaScript. From 3.15.0 until 4.0.1, the default blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin does not classify trailer.<token>.cmd as unsafe configuration. An application that passes attacker-controlled values through SimpleGitOptions.config or inline -c arguments can therefore allow Git to invoke an attacker-selected shell command when git interpret-trailers processes the configured trailer. The command executes with the operating-system identity and permissions of the Node.js process. This issue is fixed in 4.0.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102824 | 1 Eugeny | 1 Russh | 2026-09-30 | 4.3 Medium |
| Russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. Prior to 0.63.0, the hybrid ML-KEM 768 and X25519 implementation in russh/src/kex/hybrid_mlkem.rs accepts an all-zero 32-byte peer X25519 public key in both server_dh and compute_shared_secret, forcing the X25519 contribution to the combined shared secret to zero. A malicious SSH peer can therefore make the combined secret depend only on ML-KEM, defeating the hybrid exchange's intended fallback protection if ML-KEM is later weakened. This issue is fixed in version 0.63.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102820 | 2 Eugeny, Rust | 2 Russh, Pageant | 2026-09-30 | 6.2 Medium |
| pageant provides a [PageantStream] type that implements [AsyncRead] and [AsyncWrite] traits and can be used to talk to a running Pageant instance. Prior to pageant 0.2.3, the Windows pageant crate's pageant/src/wmmessage.rs MemoryMap::read function trusts a peer-controlled u32 response length supplied through the 8192-byte Pageant shared-memory mapping reached by AgentClient::connect_pageant. A local process that impersonates the Pageant window can make query_pageant_direct allocate up to approximately 4 GiB and copy beyond the mapped view, reliably crashing a russh client and conditionally exposing adjacent committed memory. This issue is fixed in pageant 0.2.3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102762 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Netx Duo | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| The NetX Duo MQTT client leaks the packet carrying a malformed PUBLISH message. Each malformed PUBLISH costs one packet, or one chain of packets, from the network driver's receive pool, and nothing returns it. A peer that can deliver a few dozen such messages exhausts the pool and stops all inbound network traffic on the device until it is rebooted. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102761 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Netx Duo | 2026-09-30 | N/A |
| NetX Duo's WebSocket client resets the unmasking cursor to the first `NX_PACKET` each time it advances through a chained packet, while the loop's upper bound belongs to the current packet. With the standard contiguous packet-pool layout, a masked server frame split across two packets therefore drives the XOR loop through the first packet's unused payload area and on through the second packet's `NX_PACKET` control block. The four-byte WebSocket masking key controls the bytes written, so the corruption is attacker-chosen rather than incidental. | ||||
| CVE-2026-102758 | 1 Eclipse | 1 Netx Duo | 2026-09-30 | 7.5 High |
| The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake. The function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller's buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer. code: nx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c ``` UINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type, USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length, const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length) { UINT current_index; USHORT current_tag; ULONG length; ULONG length_bytes; current_index = 0; current_tag = buffer[current_index]; /* <-- read before the bounds check */ if (*buffer_length < 1) { return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); } ``` The remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes > 4 || length_bytes > *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length > *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length < 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check. | ||||