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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-72143 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: ISST: Restore SST-PP control to all domains The SST-PP control offset is only restored to power domain 0 after resume. During suspend, control values are read and stored for all power domains. Use pd_info->sst_base instead of power_domain_info->sst_base, which only points to power domain 0 base address. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72141 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: imx: fix locked bus on SMBus block-read of 0 (IRQ) SMBus 3.1 6.5.7 allows a Block Read byte count of 0, but the interrupt-driven block-read state machine rejects it as -EPROTO. Worse, it returns without a NACK+STOP: the next receive cycle has already started, so the target keeps holding SDA and the bus stays stuck until a power cycle of this i2c controller. Accept count=0: NACK the in-flight dummy byte (TXAK) and set msg->len to 2 so i2c_imx_isr_read_continue() emits STOP via its normal last-byte path. The dummy byte is discarded; block-read callers only consume buf[0..count-1]. Reading I2DR has likewise already armed the next byte on the count > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX error path, so NACK it (TXAK) before aborting with -EPROTO; otherwise the failing transfer's STOP cannot complete and the bus stays held. The atomic path regressed earlier (v3.16) and is fixed separately; this patch covers only the v6.13 state-machine rework. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72137 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: nat_keepalive: avoid double free on send error nat_keepalive_send() frees the keepalive skb whenever the IPv4 or IPv6 send helper reports an error. That cleanup is only correct before the skb is handed to the output path. Once ip_build_and_send_pkt() or ip6_xmit() takes ownership, the networking stack may already have consumed the skb before returning an error, so freeing it again is unsafe. Handle the pre-handoff failure cases inside nat_keepalive_send_ipv4() and nat_keepalive_send_ipv6(), where the caller still owns the skb, and keep nat_keepalive_send() responsible only for family dispatch and the unsupported-family cleanup path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72129 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-rdma: handle inline data with a nonzero offset nvmet_rdma_use_inline_sg() maps the host-controlled inline data offset into the per-command inline scatterlist. The bounds check admits any offset with off + len <= inline_data_size, but the mapping still assumes the data begins in the first inline page: sg->offset = off; sg->length = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off); When a port is configured with inline_data_size > PAGE_SIZE (settable up to max(SZ_16K, PAGE_SIZE)), an offset in (PAGE_SIZE, inline_data_size] makes "PAGE_SIZE - off" underflow, so sg->length is set to ~4 GiB and the block backend reads far past the first inline page. num_pages(len) also ignores the offset, so an in-bounds offset whose [off, off+len) span crosses a page boundary under-counts the scatterlist. Map the offset properly: split it into a page index and an in-page offset, start the scatterlist at that page, and size the page count from page_off + len. Because the request scatterlist may now start at inline_sg[page_idx] rather than inline_sg[0], generalize the inline-SGL identity test in nvmet_rdma_release_rsp() to a range test; otherwise the persistent inline scatterlist is mistaken for an allocated one and nvmet_req_free_sgls() frees an inline page (and warns in free_large_kmalloc()). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72115 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: bcm: track a single source interface for ANYDEV timeout/throttle ops An ANYDEV rx op (ifindex == 0) with an active RX timeout and/or throttle timer has no defined semantics when matching frames arrive from several interfaces: bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently for the same op on different CPUs, racing hrtimer_cancel()/ bcm_rx_starttimer() against bcm_rx_timeout_handler() and causing spurious RX_TIMEOUT notifications and last_frames corruption. The same concurrency lets throttled multiplex frames from different interfaces clobber the single rx_ifindex/rx_stamp fields shared by the op. Add op->if_detected to track the first interface that delivers a matching frame while a timeout/throttle timer is configured, and reject frames from any other interface for that op. The claim is decided in bcm_rx_handler() before hrtimer_cancel() touches op->timer, so a rejected frame can never disturb the claimed interface's watchdog. RTR-mode ops are excluded via RX_RTR_FRAME, independent of kt_ival1/kt_ival2, since those may briefly hold a stale value from an earlier non-RTR configuration. The claim is released in bcm_notify() on NETDEV_UNREGISTER and in bcm_rx_setup() when SETTIMER reconfigures the timer values. A (re-)claim is only possible on CAN devices in NETREG_REGISTERED dev->reg_state to cover the release in bcm_notify() where reg_state becomes NETREG_UNREGISTERING until synchronize_net(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72110 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf,fork: wipe ->bpf_storage before bailouts that access it Currently, copy_process() can bail out to free_task() before p->bpf_storage has been initialized, with this call graph (shown here for the !CONFIG_MEMCG case): copy_process dup_task_struct arch_dup_task_struct [copies the entire task_struct, including ->bpf_storage member] [RLIMIT_NPROC check fails] delayed_free_task free_task bpf_task_storage_free rcu_dereference(task->bpf_storage) bpf_local_storage_destroy In this case, the nascent task's ->bpf_storage member that bpf_local_storage_destroy() operates on is a plain copy of the parent's ->bpf_storage pointer, not a real initialized pointer. This leads to badness (kernel hangs, UAF). This is reachable as long as the process calling fork() has been inserted into a task storage map. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72109 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sparx5: unregister blocking notifier on init failure sparx5_register_notifier_blocks() registers the switchdev blocking notifier before allocating the ordered workqueue. If the workqueue allocation fails, the error path unregisters the switchdev and netdevice notifiers, but leaves the blocking notifier registered. Add a separate error label for the workqueue allocation failure path and unregister the switchdev blocking notifier there. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72108 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm thin metadata: fix metadata snapshot consistency on commit failure __reserve_metadata_snap() and __release_metadata_snap() modify the superblock's held_root directly in the block_manager's buffer. If the subsequent metadata commit fails, the held_root gets flushed to disk through the abort_transaction path, resulting in inconsistent metadata. Reproducer 1: __reserve_metadata_snap() 1. Create a 2 MiB metadata device and make the region after the 14th block inaccessible, to trigger metadata commit failure in the subsequent reserve_metadata_snap operation. The 14th block will be the shadow destination for the index block. dmsetup create tmeta --table "0 112 linear /dev/sdc 0 112 3984 error" 2. Create a 16 MiB thin-pool dmsetup create tdata --table "0 32768 zero" dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/tmeta bs=4k count=1 dmsetup create tpool --table "0 32768 thin-pool /dev/mapper/tmeta \ /dev/mapper/tdata 128 0 1 skip_block_zeroing" 3. Take a metadata snapshot to trigger metadata commit failure and transaction abort. However, the held_root is written to disk, breaking metadata consistency. dmsetup message tpool 0 "reserve_metadata_snap" thin_check v1.2.2 result: Bad reference count for metadata block 6. Expected 2, but space map contains 1. Bad reference count for metadata block 7. Expected 2, but space map contains 1. Bad reference count for metadata block 13. Expected 1, but space map contains 0. Reproducer 2: __release_metadata_snap() 1. Create a 2 MiB metadata device and make the region after the 16th block inaccessible, to trigger metadata commit failure in the subsequent release_metadata_snap operation. The 16th block will be the shadow destination for the index block. dmsetup create tmeta --table "0 128 linear /dev/sdc 0 128 3968 error" 2. Create a 16 MiB thin-pool dmsetup create tdata --table "0 32768 zero" dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/tmeta bs=4k count=1 dmsetup create tpool --table "0 32768 thin-pool /dev/mapper/tmeta \ /dev/mapper/tdata 128 0 1 skip_block_zeroing" 3. Reserve then release the metadata snapshot, to trigger metadata commit failure and transaction abort. The held_root gets removed from the on-disk superblock, causing inconsistent metadata. dmsetup message tpool 0 "reserve_metadata_snap" dmsetup message tpool 0 "release_metadata_snap" thin_check v1.2.2 result: Bad reference count for metadata block 6. Expected 1, but space map contains 2. Bad reference count for metadata block 7. Expected 1, but space map contains 2. 1 metadata blocks have leaked. Fix by deferring the held_root update to commit time. Additionally, move the existing-snapshot check in __reserve_metadata_snap before the shadow operation to avoid unnecessary work. In __release_metadata_snap, clear pmd->held_root before btree deletion so partial failure leaks blocks rather than leaving a stale reference, and unlock the snapshot block before decrementing its refcount. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72107 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm era: fix out-of-bounds memory access for non-zero start sector dm-era tracks writes in target-relative blocks, but era_map() calculates the writeset block before applying the target offset. Tables with a non-zero start sector can therefore pass an absolute mapped-device block to metadata_current_marked(). If the absolute block is beyond the current writeset size, writeset_marked() tests past the end of the in-core bitset. KASAN reports this as a vmalloc-out-of-bounds access. Apply the target offset before calculating the era block so writeset lookups use the target-relative block number. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72105 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-log: fix a bitset_size overflow on 32bit machines Commit c20e36b7631d ("dm log: fix out-of-bounds write due to region_count overflow") made sure that region_count could fit in an unsigned int. But the bitmap memory isn't allocated based on region_count. It uses bitset_size (a size_t variable). The first step of calculating bitset_size is to set it to region_count, rounded up to a multiple of BITS_PER_LONG. If region_size is less than BITS_PER_LONG smaller than UINT_MAX, it will get rounded up to 2^32. On a 32bit architecture, this will make bitset_size wrap around to 0 and fail, despite region_count being valid. Since bitset_size gets divided by 8, it can hold any valid region_count. It just needs a special case to handle the rollover. If it is 0, the value rolled over, and bitset size should be set to the number of bytes needed to hold 2^32 bits. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72102 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm_early_create: fix freeing used table on dm_resume failure If dm_resume fails, the kernel attempts to free table with dm_table_destroy, but the table was already instantiated with dm_swap_table. This commit skips the call to dm_table_destroy in this case. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72100 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: fix a bug if the bio is out of limits If dm_integrity_check_limits fails, the code would exit with DM_MAPIO_KILL. However, the range would be already locked at this point, and it wouldn't be unlocked, resulting in a deadlock. Let's move the limit check up, so that when it exits, no resources are leaked. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72099 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-integrity: don't increment hash_offset twice hash_offset is already incremented in the loop "for (i = 0; i < to_copy; i++, ts--)". Do not increment it again. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72098 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-verity: fix buffer overflow in FEC calculation There's a buffer overflow in dm-verity-fec: if (neras && *neras <= v->fec->roots) fio->erasures[(*neras)++] = i; This allows *neras to reach roots + 1 (the post-increment pushes it past roots). This value is then passed as no_eras to decode_rs8(). Inside the RS decoder (lib/reed_solomon/decode_rs.c:113-121), the erasure locator polynomial loop writes lambda[j] where j can reach nroots + 1 — one element past the end of lambda[] (which is sized nroots + 1, valid indices 0..nroots). The out-of-bounds write lands on syn[0], corrupting the syndrome buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72095 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-fence: Make dma_fence_dedup_array() robust against 0-count input dma_fence_dedup_array() returns 1 when called with num_fences == 0: the for-loop body never executes, j stays at 0, and the final `return ++j` yields 1. This contradicts both the kernel-doc ("Return: Number of unique fences remaining in the array") and the natural expectation that 0 input gives 0 output. The caller __dma_fence_unwrap_merge() bails out via the `if (count == 0 || count == 1)` fast path and so is save. But amdgpu_userq_wait_*() could reach the dedup call with a zero local count and dereference an uninitialized fence slot in the array. Make the contract match the documentation by returning 0 early. This also skips an unnecessary sort() call on an empty array. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72093 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: Fix use-after-free in amdxdna_gem_dmabuf_mmap() When vm_insert_pages() fails, the error path calls vma->vm_ops->close(vma) which internally calls drm_gem_vm_close() → drm_gem_object_put(), releasing the GEM object reference acquired at the start of the function. However, the close_vma label then falls through to put_obj, which calls drm_gem_object_put() a second time on the same object. If the first put releases the last reference, the object is freed and the second put accesses freed memory, causing a use-after-free. Fix by returning directly from close_vma instead of falling through to put_obj, since the close handler already performs all necessary cleanup including the object put. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72090 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: Use caller client for debug BO sync amdxdna_drm_sync_bo_ioctl() looks up args->handle in the ioctl caller's drm_file. For SYNC_DIRECT_FROM_DEVICE, it then calls amdxdna_hwctx_sync_debug_bo(), but passes abo->client. amdxdna_hwctx_sync_debug_bo() uses the passed client both as the handle namespace for debug_bo_hdl and as the owner of the hardware context xarray. Those must match the file that supplied args->handle. The BO's stored client pointer is object state, not the ioctl context. Pass filp->driver_priv instead, matching the original handle lookup. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72089 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ivpu: Reject firmware log with size smaller than header fw_log_from_bo() validates the tracing buffer header_size and that the log fits within the BO, but never checks that log->size is at least log->header_size. fw_log_print_buffer() then computes: u32 data_size = log->size - log->header_size; which underflows to a near-U32_MAX value when firmware reports a log whose size is smaller than its header. That huge data_size defeats the log_start/log_end bounds clamps added by commit dd1311bcf0e6 ("accel/ivpu: Add bounds checks for firmware log indices"), so fw_log_print_lines() reads far past the small real data region of the BO. A size of 0 also makes fw_log_from_bo() advance the offset by 0, causing the callers to loop forever on the same header. Reject logs whose size is smaller than the header (which also rejects size == 0). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72085 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: xen: scsiback: Free unsubmitted command instead of double-putting it scsiback_get_pend_req() obtains a command tag and returns a vscsibk_pend whose embedded se_cmd has only been memset to 0, so its cmd_kref is 0; the se_cmd is initialised (kref_init() via target_init_cmd()) only later, in scsiback_cmd_exec(), on the successful VSCSIIF_ACT_SCSI_CDB path. The two error paths in scsiback_do_cmd_fn() taken before the command is submitted -- a failed scsiback_gnttab_data_map() and an unknown ring_req.act -- call transport_generic_free_cmd(&pending_req->se_cmd, 0), which kref_put()s a refcount of 0. That underflows it ("refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free") and, as the release function is not run, leaks the command tag. Impact: a pvSCSI guest can leak every command tag of a LUN's session, stopping the LUN, by submitting requests with a bad grant reference or an unknown request type; under panic_on_warn the refcount underflow panics the host. Add a helper that just returns the tag with target_free_tag() and sends the error response. It frees the tag while the v2p reference still pins the session, and snapshots the response fields beforehand because freeing the tag can let another ring reuse the pending_req slot. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72084 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: Bound PR-OUT TransportID parsing to the received buffer core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() and core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move() hand the raw PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT parameter buffer to target_parse_pr_out_transport_id() without telling it how many bytes are valid. For an iSCSI TransportID (FORMAT CODE 01b), iscsi_parse_pr_out_transport_id() locates the ",i,0x" ISID separator with an unbounded strstr() (and on the error path prints the name with a further unbounded "%s"). An initiator can submit a TransportID whose iSCSI name contains neither a ",i,0x" substring nor a NUL terminator, filling the parameter list to its end, so the scan runs off the end of the buffer. When the parameter list spans more than one page the buffer is a multi-page vmap (transport_kmap_data_sg()), so the over-read walks into the trailing vmalloc guard page and oopses (KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in strstr). It is reachable by any fabric that delivers a PR OUT to a device exported through an iSCSI TPG, including a guest via vhost-scsi. Pass the number of received bytes down to the parser and validate the iSCSI TransportID's own self-described length (ADDITIONAL LENGTH + 4) once, up front: reject it if it is below the spc4r17 minimum or larger than the received buffer, then bound the separator search, the ISID walk and the name copy by that length. This is the length check the callers already perform after the parse (core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port() compares tid_len against tpdl, core_scsi3_emulate_register_and_move() validates it against data_length), moved ahead of the scan. Also drop the unbounded "%s" of the unterminated name. Add per-format explicit name-length checks before copying into i_str, rather than silently truncating with min_t: for FORMAT CODE 00b reject if the descriptor body (tid_len - 4 bytes) cannot fit in i_str[TRANSPORT_IQN_LEN]; for FORMAT CODE 01b reject if the name portion (from &buf[4] up to the separator) cannot fit. Both checks make the bounds intent explicit at each format branch. While here, also reject a FORMAT CODE 01b TransportID whose ",i,0x" separator sits at the very end of the descriptor: that leaves an empty ISID and points the returned port nexus pointer at buf + tid_len, one past the descriptor, which the registration code (__core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg(), __core_scsi3_alloc_registration()) then dereferences as the ISID string -- the same over-read of the parameter buffer for a malformed descriptor. | ||||