| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Grav CMS before 2.0.0-beta.2 contains multiple code-execution vulnerabilities. Three unsafe unserialize() calls - in Scheduler\JobQueue, Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache, and Session - deserialize untrusted data without restricting allowed classes, enabling PHP object injection and, via a gadget chain, arbitrary code execution where an attacker controls the serialized input. Additionally, InstallCommand's git clone operation passes the branch, url, and path parameters into a shell command without escaping, allowing OS command injection via plugin/theme installation (which requires admin access). A Twig security blocklist bypass (server-side template injection) is also present. The issues are fixed in 2.0.0-beta.2. |
| picklescan before 0.0.29 fails to detect the built-in python profile.Profile.run function when used in pickle reduce methods, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code. Remote attackers can craft malicious pickle files that bypass picklescan detection and achieve code execution upon deserialization. |
| picklescan before 0.0.29 fails to detect malicious pickle files using code.InteractiveInterpreter.runcode in reduce methods. Attackers can craft pickle payloads that bypass picklescan detection and execute arbitrary code when loaded via pickle.load(). |
| picklescan before 0.0.30 fails to detect the doctest.debug_script function when analyzing pickle files, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code. Remote attackers can craft malicious pickle files embedding doctest.debug_script calls that bypass picklescan detection and execute arbitrary commands upon pickle.load invocation. |
| picklescan before 0.0.30 fails to detect cProfile.run function calls in pickle reduce methods, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code. Remote attackers can craft malicious pickle files with cProfile.run payloads that bypass picklescan detection and achieve code execution upon deserialization. |
| picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious pickle files using torch.utils.collect_env.run function in reduce methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes remote commands when loaded by victims. |
| picklescan before 0.0.29 fails to detect the built-in trace.Trace.run function when analyzing pickle files, allowing attackers to embed undetected malicious code. Remote attackers can craft malicious pickle files using trace.Trace.run in the reduce method to achieve arbitrary code execution when pickle.load processes the file. |
| IBM WebSphere Extreme Scale 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.6 ships three ObjectInputStream subclasses (WsObjectInputStream, ObjectStreamPool$ReusableInputStream, ObjectInputStreamResolver) that install no JEP-290 class filter; when Coherence is on the classpath, multiple RCE gadget chains including RemoteConstructor.readResolve and PriorityQueue/ExtractorComparator are confirmed working, allowing a post-login attacker who can write a session attribute or a LAN-adjacent attacker on the grid replication wire to execute arbitrary code on peer WAS JVMs |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 allows users with Redis access to execute arbitrary code with full application privileges, compromising all secrets, data, and system integrity. |
| The Export User Data plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the unserialize function in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.6. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). Successful exploitation requires an administrator to trigger a user data export while a subscriber-level (or higher) user has stored a crafted serialized XLSXWriter object payload as their display name. |
| The affected product is vulnerable to a deserialization of untrusted data, which may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. |
| PyTorch is a Python package that provides tensor computation. Prior to version 2.10.0, a vulnerability in PyTorch's `weights_only` unpickler allows an attacker to craft a malicious checkpoint file (`.pth`) that, when loaded with `torch.load(..., weights_only=True)`, can corrupt memory and potentially lead to arbitrary code execution. Version 2.10.0 fixes the issue. |
| A flaw was found in grub2. Grub's dump command is not blocked when grub is in lockdown mode, which allows the user to read any memory information, and an attacker may leverage this in order to extract signatures, salts, and other sensitive information from the memory. |
| Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) ViewState add-on before version 4 contains an insecure deserialization vulnerability that allows attackers who control a proxied web server to achieve arbitrary code execution by embedding a malicious serialized Java object in the javax.faces.ViewState HTTP response parameter. The JSFViewState.decode() method base64-decodes the ViewState value and passes it directly to ObjectInputStream.readObject() without a deserialization filter, allowlist, or type restriction, causing the malicious object to be deserialized within the ZAP JVM when the Desktop UI renders the ViewState panel. |
| Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader
Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3
Description:
The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class.
Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check.
Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load.
Mitigation:
* 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9.
* 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3.
Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization. |
| Subscriber PHP Object Injection in Uncanny Automator Pro <= 7.3.0.6 versions. |
| OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to , the official openproject/openproject Docker image ships ENV SECRET_KEY_BASE=OVERWRITE_ME as the default Rails master key. Combined with cookies_serializer = :marshal, this gives any logged-in user a deterministic Marshal-deserialization path reachable via the /my/two_factor_devices cookie reader This vulnerability is fixed in . |
| Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Uncanny Automator <= 7.3.1.2 versions. |
| Subscriber PHP Object Injection in RealHomes <= 4.5.3 versions. |
| Subscriber PHP Object Injection in Buddyboss Platform <= 3.0.4 versions. |
