| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, PyJWT HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key is affected because HMAC key guard only recognizes top-level public JWK forms and misses container representations. This occurs when an application allows HMAC and asymmetric algorithms and passes a public JWK container as the raw key. As a result, public asymmetric key material is accepted as the HMAC secret. Consequently, an attacker who knows the public key can forge a token with arbitrary authenticated claims. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key in jwt/algorithms.py is affected because raw-JWK detector does not normalize accepted Unicode byte-order marks before checking for JSON. This occurs when a public JWK is prefixed with a UTF-8 BOM and used in a mixed-algorithm verification path. As a result, public JWK bypasses asymmetric-key detection and becomes the HMAC secret. Consequently, an attacker who knows the public key can forge authenticated tokens. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.4.0 until 2.14.0, PyJWT HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key is affected because asymmetric-key guard relies on textual markers that are absent from DER encoding. This occurs when an application mixes HMAC and asymmetric algorithms and supplies a DER public key as the shared verification key. As a result, PyJWT uses public DER bytes as an HMAC secret. Consequently, an attacker who knows the public key can forge authenticated HMAC tokens. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. Prior to 2.14.0, is_pem_format in jwt/utils.py is affected because is_pem_format does not recognize every PEM representation accepted by the cryptography loader. This occurs when an application mixes HMAC and asymmetric algorithms and supplies a mutated public-key PEM as raw key bytes. As a result, HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key treats the unrecognized asymmetric public key as an HMAC secret. Consequently, an attacker who knows the public key can forge authenticated HMAC tokens. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, HMACAlgorithm.from_jwk is affected because PyJWK verification path used the decoded key without applying prepare_key validation. This occurs when a trusted JWK Set contains an oct entry with an empty k value. As a result, an attacker signs an HMAC token with the same zero-length key accepted by PyJWT. Consequently, forged token can carry arbitrary authenticated claims. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| The Payment Gateway of Stripe for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.8. This is due to the publicly accessible `woocommerce_api_wt_stripe` webhook endpoint (`EH_Stripe_Webhook_Handler::handle()`) wrapping the only call to `\Stripe\Webhook::constructEvent()` inside an `if (!empty($endpoint_secret))` guard that is never entered on default installations — because the `eh_stripe_webhook_secret` option is empty after a fresh plugin install — causing the raw, attacker-controlled POST body to be decoded and processed as a fully trusted Stripe event without any signature verification, authentication, or authorization. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send forged Stripe webhook events to manipulate WooCommerce order statuses, including marking unpaid orders as paid or completed via `payment_complete()`, forcing legitimate orders into a failed state, fabricating dispute notifications, and injecting forged refund events. This vulnerability is only exploitable when the Stripe webhook signing secret has not been configured by an administrator; once a valid signing secret is saved, `\Stripe\Webhook::constructEvent()` is enforced and forged requests are rejected. |
| Python Social Auth is a social authentication/registration mechanism. Prior to version 5.0.0, the `vk-app` backend accepted VK application callback data without verifying the callback signature when the `auth_key` parameter was omitted. Applications using this backend could treat unsigned attacker-controlled data as a verified VK identity. An attacker could choose callback fields such as `viewer_id`, `access_token`, `api_id`, and `api_result`, potentially allowing authentication as an arbitrary VK user ID. The issue affects only applications using the `vk-app` backend. The issue has been fixed in version 5.0.0 by requiring `auth_key` to be present and valid before callback data is trusted. |
| Improper OCSP response validation in the Snowflake Python, Go, JDBC, and Node.js drivers allowed a revoked TLS certificate to be accepted as valid, because OCSP responses were not reliably bound to the certificate being validated and definitive verification failures were treated as transient. A man-in-the-middle attacker holding a revoked certificate and its private key for a Snowflake or stage hostname could cause the driver to establish a TLS session to the attacker-controlled endpoint anyway, allowing the attacker to read and modify data transmitted within that connection. Successful exploitation requires that on-path position and the corresponding private key, and impact is limited to data carried within the intercepted connection. The fix is available in Snowflake Connector for Python v4.7.3, Snowflake Go Driver v2.2.0, Snowflake JDBC Driver v4.3.4 (including the snowflake-jdbc-fips and snowflake-jdbc-thin), and Snowflake Node.js Driver v3.3.0. Users must manually upgrade. |
| An issue in OpenDDS 3.33.x allows a local attacker to cause a denial of service via the verify function in the SIgnedDocument module |
| Contrast is a Kubernetes runtime for confidential containers. In versions before 1.12.1, the secure persistent volume feature is vulnerable to a malicious host supplying a crafted LUKS2 volume to a pod VM. LUKS2 volume metadata is not authenticated and, with cryptsetup versions prior to 2.8.1, a header specifying the null keyslot encryption algorithm (cipher_null-ecb) is accepted without error. Because the Contrast Initializer assumes a device is protected if `cryptsetup open` succeeds with the secret seed, the guest will open the attacker-supplied volume and write secret data in plaintext, or under a volume key known to the attacker, allowing the host to read confidential data that should have been encrypted. Contrast v1.12.1 ships cryptsetup 2.8.1, which disables null ciphers in keyslots when the passphrase is non-empty; v1.13.0 adds detached-header validation in guest memory and integrity protection for secure persistent storage. Contrast persistent volumes were not integrity protected, so integrity impact is not considered. |
| Under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, ProcessPeerCertParse() runs the certificate signature check separately from the parse to keep peak memory down, then merges the two results, but it merged the signature result back only when the parse returned 0, so any parse error hid it. ParseCertRelative() reaches its validity-date, name-constraint and critical-extension checks only after ConfirmSignature() has passed, so splitting the signature check out inverts the precedence that makes "override date errors" a sound policy, and ASN_SIG_CONFIRM_E is never surfaced anywhere. The attacker needs no key material from the real PKI and no CA compromise: a self-made certificate carrying the expected subject name, the trusted CA's subject as its issuer, arbitrary bytes where the signature goes, a validity window in the past and the attacker's own key pair is sufficient. Affected builds define WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which is off by default, is not set implicitly by any platform or preset header, and is not reachable from any CMake option; the autotools routes are --enable-lowresource, --enable-leantls, --enable-tinytls13=cert and --enable-tinytls13=mutualauth, and examples/configs/user_settings_embedded.h reaches it through WC_CFG_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which ships as 0, while neither --enable-all nor --enable-distro enables it at all. The application must additionally install a verify callback through wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify() or wolfSSL_set_verify() with WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER that returns 1 for ASN_BEFORE_DATE_E or ASN_AFTER_DATE_E; wolfSSL ships this exact shape as myVerify() in wolfssl/test.h under VERIFY_OVERRIDE_DATE_ERR, which examples/client -D selects. An application with no callback, or whose callback returns preverify for date errors, still fails the handshake, and wolfSSL_CertManagerVerifyBuffer() and wc_CheckCertSignature() report ASN_SIG_CONFIRM_E correctly in the same binary. TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 are affected in both directions, and DTLS reaches the same function; where the forged certificate is a chain certificate the callback's consent causes it to be cached in the WOLFSSL_CTX certificate manager, so an exposed deployment must restart the context or the process rather than merely reconnect. |
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.2, summary In Zammad's inbound PGP email processing, the return value of the gpg verification call was silently discarded. Regardless of whether gpg reported a valid, invalid, or missing signature, the handler unconditionally wrote sign: { success: true, comment: "Good signature" } to the article's security preferences. Impact Any sender could tamper with the body of a multipart/signed PGP email, or craft a message with an entirely fabricated or mismatched signature, and Zammad would display it to the recipient as cryptographically verified with a "Good signature" label. Users and agents relying on Zammad's signature indicator to confirm message authenticity and integrity would be misled into trusting modified or forged content. The vulnerability affects all inbound PGP-signed emails processed while the PGP integration is enabled. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.2. |
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, when Zammad checks the digital signature on an incoming S/MIME-signed email, it does not verify that the signing certificate is genuinely trusted, it only checks whether a certificate with a matching name is already stored in the system. An attacker can create their own certificate using the name of a real, previously trusted sender and use it to send a forged email. Zammad will display that email with the same "validly signed" indicator as a genuine message from the real sender, even though the attacker never had access to that sender's actual certificate or private key. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2. |
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. In 7.0.3 and 7.1.1, under certain conditions, Zammad's verification of inbound PGP-signed email can mark a message as carrying a valid ("Good") PGP signature from a registered sender key, even though the displayed message content is not actually covered by that signature. As a result, the inbound article may be stored with a successful signature status that does not reflect the authenticity of the shown content. This can mislead agents who rely on the signature indicator when assessing the trustworthiness of incoming mail. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2. |
| MinIO through 7aac2a2 does not verify that every x-amz-* header present on a request also appears in the client-supplied X-Amz-SignedHeaders list. extractSignedHeaders() in cmd/signature-v4-utils.go iterates only the claimed list and never enumerates the headers that actually arrived, and thus a header that arrives unsigned is neither hashed into the canonical request nor rejected. Because cmd/api-router.go dispatches CopyObject on the presence of x-amz-copy-source alone, the holder of a presigned PUT URL scoped to a single object can add that header to the unmodified URL and cause a server-side copy, executed as the signer, of any object the signing key can read. A grant to write one object becomes a read of every bucket that key can reach. Amazon S3 rejects the equivalent request with HTTP 403 AccessDenied. The minio/minio GitHub repository was archived in April 2026; pgsty/silo before 1233254 is also affected. |
| RouterOS does not compare the complete RSA public key when matching an SSH authentication request to an authorized user key, checking the key type and modulus but omitting the exponent. Because signature verification uses the client-supplied key, an attacker knowing an authorized RSA modulus can supply a key with exponent one, forge a valid signature, and open an SSH command channel as the target user without the private key.This issue affects only 7.x branch was fixed in versions: 7.23.4 (Long-term) and 7.24.2 (Stable) |
| MikroTik RouterOS accepts malformed RSA/PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures across RSA-based services, including TLS/X.509 certificate validation and SSH host-key authentication. Because its trust store includes an e=3 root CA, an attacker controlling or redirecting an outbound RouterOS TLS connection can use the root’s public certificate - without its private key - to forge a trusted intermediate and issue certificates for arbitrary hostnames, enabling TLS server impersonation. The same permissive verification also undermines RSA-based SSH authentication.
This issue affects only 7.x branch was fixed in versions: 7.23.6 (Long-term) and 7.24.3 (Stable).
Releases 7.23.4 and 7.24.2 included an incomplete fix. |
| IRONMACE Ironshield 1.0.0.167 has a tvk.sys kernel-mode driver that authenticates client executables by checking for expected publisher and root-certificate strings in WIN_CERTIFICATE data ("IRONMACE Co., Ltd." and "DigiCert Trusted Root G4") instead of parsing and validating the PKCS signature data. As a result, a local unprivileged attacker may bypass this via crafted certificate data and obtain access to privileged IOCTL functionality. |
| A flaw was found in Picketlink's SP signature validation; a SAML response containing zero assertion elements matching the signature check can allow an attacker to forge a SAML response and auth as any principal with any roles on the protected application. |
| A flaw was found in Picketlink Federation SAML; the unsolcited response handler would accept forged assertions with no verification or validation, permitting an unauthed attacker to authenticate as any principal in any role. This could lead to information disclosure, access to restricted operations, or other flaws. |
