| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsnotify: Fix ordering of iput() and watched_objects decrement
Ensure the superblock is kept alive until we're done with iput().
Holding a reference to an inode is not allowed unless we ensure the
superblock stays alive, which fsnotify does by keeping the
watched_objects count elevated, so iput() must happen before the
watched_objects decrement.
This can lead to a UAF of something like sb->s_fs_info in tmpfs, but the
UAF is hard to hit because race orderings that oops are more likely, thanks
to the CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() block in generic_shutdown_super().
Also, ensure that fsnotify_put_sb_watched_objects() doesn't call
fsnotify_sb_watched_objects() on a superblock that may have already been
freed, which would cause a UAF read of sb->s_fsnotify_info. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix possible UAF in sctp_v6_available()
A lockdep report [1] with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y hints
that sctp_v6_available() is calling dev_get_by_index_rcu()
and ipv6_chk_addr() without holding rcu.
[1]
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216 Tainted: G W
-----------------------------
net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by sctp_hello/31495:
#0: ffff9f1ebbdb7418 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sctp_bind (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 net/sctp/socket.c:315) sctp
stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 31495 Comm: sctp_hello Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822)
dev_get_by_index_rcu (net/core/dev.c:876 (discriminator 7))
sctp_v6_available (net/sctp/ipv6.c:701) sctp
sctp_do_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:400 (discriminator 1)) sctp
sctp_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:320) sctp
inet6_bind_sk (net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:465)
? security_socket_bind (security/security.c:4581 (discriminator 1))
__sys_bind (net/socket.c:1848 net/socket.c:1869)
? do_user_addr_fault (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:880 ./include/linux/mm.h:729 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340)
? do_user_addr_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:98 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:882 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/mm.h:729 (discriminator 13) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340 (discriminator 13))
__x64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1877 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1))
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
RIP: 0033:0x7f59b934a1e7
Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 b8 31 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
All code
========
0: 44 00 00 add %r8b,(%rax)
3: 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c39(%rip),%rdx # 0xc8c43
a: f7 d8 neg %eax
c: 64 89 02 mov %eax,%fs:(%rdx)
f: b8 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffff,%eax
14: eb bd jmp 0xffffffffffffffd3
16: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 cs nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
1d: 00 00 00
20: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax)
23: b8 31 00 00 00 mov $0x31,%eax
28: 0f 05 syscall
2a:* 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax <-- trapping instruction
30: 73 01 jae 0x33
32: c3 ret
33: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c43
3a: f7 d8 neg %eax
3c: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx)
3f: 48 rex.W
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax
6: 73 01 jae 0x9
8: c3 ret
9: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c19
10: f7 d8 neg %eax
12: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx)
15: 48 rex.W
RSP: 002b:00007ffe2d0ad398 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RCX: 00007f59b934a1e7
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007f59b9253298 R11: 000000000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Prevent a bad reference count on CPU nodes
When populating cache leaves we previously fetched the CPU device node
at the very beginning. But when ACPI is enabled we go through a
specific branch which returns early and does not call 'of_node_put' for
the node that was acquired.
Since we are not using a CPU device node for the ACPI code anyways, we
can simply move the initialization of it just passed the ACPI block, and
we are guaranteed to have an 'of_node_put' call for the acquired node.
This prevents a bad reference count of the CPU device node.
Moreover, the previous function did not check for errors when acquiring
the device node, so a return -ENOENT has been added for that case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix slab-use-after-free in scmi_bus_notifier()
The scmi_dev->name is released prematurely in __scmi_device_destroy(),
which causes slab-use-after-free when accessing scmi_dev->name in
scmi_bus_notifier(). So move the release of scmi_dev->name to
scmi_device_release() to avoid slab-use-after-free.
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strncmp+0xe4/0xec
| Read of size 1 at addr ffffff80a482bcc0 by task swapper/0/1
|
| CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.38-debug #1
| Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SA8775P Ride (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0x94/0x114
| show_stack+0x18/0x24
| dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60
| print_report+0xf4/0x5b0
| kasan_report+0xa4/0xec
| __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x2c
| strncmp+0xe4/0xec
| scmi_bus_notifier+0x5c/0x54c
| notifier_call_chain+0xb4/0x31c
| blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x68/0x9c
| bus_notify+0x54/0x78
| device_del+0x1bc/0x840
| device_unregister+0x20/0xb4
| __scmi_device_destroy+0xac/0x280
| scmi_device_destroy+0x94/0xd0
| scmi_chan_setup+0x524/0x750
| scmi_probe+0x7fc/0x1508
| platform_probe+0xc4/0x19c
| really_probe+0x32c/0x99c
| __driver_probe_device+0x15c/0x3c4
| driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x170
| __driver_attach+0x1c8/0x440
| bus_for_each_dev+0xf4/0x178
| driver_attach+0x3c/0x58
| bus_add_driver+0x234/0x4d4
| driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0
| __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88
| scmi_driver_init+0xb0/0x104
| do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x664
| kernel_init_freeable+0x3c8/0x894
| kernel_init+0x24/0x1e8
| ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
|
| Allocated by task 1:
| kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54
| kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40
| kasan_save_alloc_info+0x24/0x34
| __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb8
| __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x6c/0x104
| kstrdup+0x48/0x84
| kstrdup_const+0x34/0x40
| __scmi_device_create.part.0+0x8c/0x408
| scmi_device_create+0x104/0x370
| scmi_chan_setup+0x2a0/0x750
| scmi_probe+0x7fc/0x1508
| platform_probe+0xc4/0x19c
| really_probe+0x32c/0x99c
| __driver_probe_device+0x15c/0x3c4
| driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x170
| __driver_attach+0x1c8/0x440
| bus_for_each_dev+0xf4/0x178
| driver_attach+0x3c/0x58
| bus_add_driver+0x234/0x4d4
| driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0
| __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88
| scmi_driver_init+0xb0/0x104
| do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x664
| kernel_init_freeable+0x3c8/0x894
| kernel_init+0x24/0x1e8
| ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
|
| Freed by task 1:
| kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54
| kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40
| kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x5c
| __kasan_slab_free+0xe8/0x164
| __kmem_cache_free+0x11c/0x230
| kfree+0x70/0x130
| kfree_const+0x20/0x40
| __scmi_device_destroy+0x70/0x280
| scmi_device_destroy+0x94/0xd0
| scmi_chan_setup+0x524/0x750
| scmi_probe+0x7fc/0x1508
| platform_probe+0xc4/0x19c
| really_probe+0x32c/0x99c
| __driver_probe_device+0x15c/0x3c4
| driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x170
| __driver_attach+0x1c8/0x440
| bus_for_each_dev+0xf4/0x178
| driver_attach+0x3c/0x58
| bus_add_driver+0x234/0x4d4
| driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0
| __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88
| scmi_driver_init+0xb0/0x104
| do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x664
| kernel_init_freeable+0x3c8/0x894
| kernel_init+0x24/0x1e8
| ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Start the RTC update work later
The RTC update work involves runtime resuming the UFS controller. Hence,
only start the RTC update work after runtime power management in the UFS
driver has been fully initialized. This patch fixes the following kernel
crash:
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Workqueue: events ufshcd_rtc_work
Call trace:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c (P)
pm_runtime_get_if_active+0x24/0x9c (L)
pm_runtime_get_if_active+0x24/0x9c
ufshcd_rtc_work+0x138/0x1b4
process_one_work+0x148/0x288
worker_thread+0x2cc/0x3d4
kthread+0x110/0x114
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix another deadlock during RTC update
If ufshcd_rtc_work calls ufshcd_rpm_put_sync() and the pm's usage_count
is 0, we will enter the runtime suspend callback. However, the runtime
suspend callback will wait to flush ufshcd_rtc_work, causing a deadlock.
Replace ufshcd_rpm_put_sync() with ufshcd_rpm_put() to avoid the
deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/port: Fix use-after-free, permit out-of-order decoder shutdown
In support of investigating an initialization failure report [1],
cxl_test was updated to register mock memory-devices after the mock
root-port/bus device had been registered. That led to cxl_test crashing
with a use-after-free bug with the following signature:
cxl_port_attach_region: cxl region3: cxl_host_bridge.0:port3 decoder3.0 add: mem0:decoder7.0 @ 0 next: cxl_switch_uport.0 nr_eps: 1 nr_targets: 1
cxl_port_attach_region: cxl region3: cxl_host_bridge.0:port3 decoder3.0 add: mem4:decoder14.0 @ 1 next: cxl_switch_uport.0 nr_eps: 2 nr_targets: 1
cxl_port_setup_targets: cxl region3: cxl_switch_uport.0:port6 target[0] = cxl_switch_dport.0 for mem0:decoder7.0 @ 0
1) cxl_port_setup_targets: cxl region3: cxl_switch_uport.0:port6 target[1] = cxl_switch_dport.4 for mem4:decoder14.0 @ 1
[..]
cxld_unregister: cxl decoder14.0:
cxl_region_decode_reset: cxl_region region3:
mock_decoder_reset: cxl_port port3: decoder3.0 reset
2) mock_decoder_reset: cxl_port port3: decoder3.0: out of order reset, expected decoder3.1
cxl_endpoint_decoder_release: cxl decoder14.0:
[..]
cxld_unregister: cxl decoder7.0:
3) cxl_region_decode_reset: cxl_region region3:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6bc3: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[..]
RIP: 0010:to_cxl_port+0x8/0x60 [cxl_core]
[..]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cxl_region_decode_reset+0x69/0x190 [cxl_core]
cxl_region_detach+0xe8/0x210 [cxl_core]
cxl_decoder_kill_region+0x27/0x40 [cxl_core]
cxld_unregister+0x5d/0x60 [cxl_core]
At 1) a region has been established with 2 endpoint decoders (7.0 and
14.0). Those endpoints share a common switch-decoder in the topology
(3.0). At teardown, 2), decoder14.0 is the first to be removed and hits
the "out of order reset case" in the switch decoder. The effect though
is that region3 cleanup is aborted leaving it in-tact and
referencing decoder14.0. At 3) the second attempt to teardown region3
trips over the stale decoder14.0 object which has long since been
deleted.
The fix here is to recognize that the CXL specification places no
mandate on in-order shutdown of switch-decoders, the driver enforces
in-order allocation, and hardware enforces in-order commit. So, rather
than fail and leave objects dangling, always remove them.
In support of making cxl_region_decode_reset() always succeed,
cxl_region_invalidate_memregion() failures are turned into warnings.
Crashing the kernel is ok there since system integrity is at risk if
caches cannot be managed around physical address mutation events like
CXL region destruction.
A new device_for_each_child_reverse_from() is added to cleanup
port->commit_end after all dependent decoders have been disabled. In
other words if decoders are allocated 0->1->2 and disabled 1->2->0 then
port->commit_end only decrements from 2 after 2 has been disabled, and
it decrements all the way to zero since 1 was disabled previously. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Vangogh: Fix kernel memory out of bounds write
KASAN reports that the GPU metrics table allocated in
vangogh_tables_init() is not large enough for the memset done in
smu_cmn_init_soft_gpu_metrics(). Condensed report follows:
[ 33.861314] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smu_cmn_init_soft_gpu_metrics+0x73/0x200 [amdgpu]
[ 33.861799] Write of size 168 at addr ffff888129f59500 by task mangoapp/1067
...
[ 33.861808] CPU: 6 UID: 1000 PID: 1067 Comm: mangoapp Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc4 #356 1a56f59a8b5182eeaf67eb7cb8b13594dd23b544
[ 33.861816] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 33.861818] Hardware name: Valve Galileo/Galileo, BIOS F7G0107 12/01/2023
[ 33.861822] Call Trace:
[ 33.861826] <TASK>
[ 33.861829] dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0x90
[ 33.861838] print_report+0xce/0x620
[ 33.861853] kasan_report+0xda/0x110
[ 33.862794] kasan_check_range+0xfd/0x1a0
[ 33.862799] __asan_memset+0x23/0x40
[ 33.862803] smu_cmn_init_soft_gpu_metrics+0x73/0x200 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.863306] vangogh_get_gpu_metrics_v2_4+0x123/0xad0 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.864257] vangogh_common_get_gpu_metrics+0xb0c/0xbc0 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.865682] amdgpu_dpm_get_gpu_metrics+0xcc/0x110 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.866160] amdgpu_get_gpu_metrics+0x154/0x2d0 [amdgpu 13b1bc364ec578808f676eba412c20eaab792779]
[ 33.867135] dev_attr_show+0x43/0xc0
[ 33.867147] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1f1/0x3b0
[ 33.867155] seq_read_iter+0x3f8/0x1140
[ 33.867173] vfs_read+0x76c/0xc50
[ 33.867198] ksys_read+0xfb/0x1d0
[ 33.867214] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x160
...
[ 33.867353] Allocated by task 378 on cpu 7 at 22.794876s:
[ 33.867358] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50
[ 33.867364] kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
[ 33.867367] __kasan_kmalloc+0x87/0x90
[ 33.867371] vangogh_init_smc_tables+0x3f9/0x840 [amdgpu]
[ 33.867835] smu_sw_init+0xa32/0x1850 [amdgpu]
[ 33.868299] amdgpu_device_init+0x467b/0x8d90 [amdgpu]
[ 33.868733] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x19/0xf0 [amdgpu]
[ 33.869167] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x2d6/0xcd0 [amdgpu]
[ 33.869608] local_pci_probe+0xda/0x180
[ 33.869614] pci_device_probe+0x43f/0x6b0
Empirically we can confirm that the former allocates 152 bytes for the
table, while the latter memsets the 168 large block.
Root cause appears that when GPU metrics tables for v2_4 parts were added
it was not considered to enlarge the table to fit.
The fix in this patch is rather "brute force" and perhaps later should be
done in a smarter way, by extracting and consolidating the part version to
size logic to a common helper, instead of brute forcing the largest
possible allocation. Nevertheless, for now this works and fixes the out of
bounds write.
v2:
* Drop impossible v3_0 case. (Mario)
(cherry picked from commit 0880f58f9609f0200483a49429af0f050d281703) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Avoid CPU lockups due fifo occupancy check loop
Driver waits indefinitely for the fifo occupancy to go below a threshold
as soon as the pacing interrupt is received. This can cause soft lockup on
one of the processors, if the rate of DB is very high.
Add a loop count for FPGA and exit the __wait_for_fifo_occupancy_below_th
if the loop is taking more time. Pacing will be continuing until the
occupancy is below the threshold. This is ensured by the checks in
bnxt_re_pacing_timer_exp and further scheduling the work for pacing based
on the fifo occupancy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Don't free job in TDR
Freeing job in TDR is not safe as TDR can pass the run_job thread
resulting in UAF. It is only safe for free job to naturally be called by
the scheduler. Rather free job in TDR, add to pending list.
(cherry picked from commit ea2f6a77d0c40d97f4a4dc93fee4afe15d94926d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
reset: starfive: jh71x0: Fix accessing the empty member on JH7110 SoC
data->asserted will be NULL on JH7110 SoC since commit 82327b127d41
("reset: starfive: Add StarFive JH7110 reset driver") was added. Add
the judgment condition to avoid errors when calling reset_control_status
on JH7110 SoC. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bpf: must hold reference on net namespace
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x640/0x6b0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880106fe400 by task repro/72=
bpf_nf_link_release+0xda/0x1e0
bpf_link_free+0x139/0x2d0
bpf_link_release+0x68/0x80
__fput+0x414/0xb60
Eric says:
It seems that bpf was able to defer the __nf_unregister_net_hook()
after exit()/close() time.
Perhaps a netns reference is missing, because the netns has been
dismantled/freed already.
bpf_nf_link_attach() does :
link->net = net;
But I do not see a reference being taken on net.
Add such a reference and release it after hook unreg.
Note that I was unable to get syzbot reproducer to work, so I
do not know if this resolves this splat. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Unregister redistributor for failed vCPU creation
Alex reports that syzkaller has managed to trigger a use-after-free when
tearing down a VM:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769
Read of size 8 at addr ffffff801c6890d0 by task syz.3.2219/10758
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 10758 Comm: syz.3.2219 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-dirty #64
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x17c/0x1a8 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:317
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:324
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x94/0xc0 lib/dump_stack.c:119
print_report+0x144/0x7a4 mm/kasan/report.c:377
kasan_report+0xcc/0x128 mm/kasan/report.c:601
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381
kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769
kvm_vm_release+0x4c/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1409
__fput+0x198/0x71c fs/file_table.c:422
____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:450
task_work_run+0x1cc/0x23c kernel/task_work.c:228
do_notify_resume+0x144/0x1a0 include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50
el0_svc+0x64/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Upon closer inspection, it appears that we do not properly tear down the
MMIO registration for a vCPU that fails creation late in the game, e.g.
a vCPU w/ the same ID already exists in the VM.
It is important to consider the context of commit that introduced this bug
by moving the unregistration out of __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). That
change correctly sought to avoid an srcu v. config_lock inversion by
breaking up the vCPU teardown into two parts, one guarded by the
config_lock.
Fix the use-after-free while avoiding lock inversion by adding a
special-cased unregistration to __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). This is safe
because failed vCPUs are torn down outside of the config_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: stm32: check devm_kasprintf() returned value
devm_kasprintf() can return a NULL pointer on failure but this returned
value is not checked. Fix this lack and check the returned value.
Found by code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: free secondary algorithms names
We need to kfree() secondary algorithms names when reset zram device that
had multi-streams, otherwise we leak memory.
[senozhatsky@chromium.org: kfree(NULL) is legal] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/fbdev-dma: Only cleanup deferred I/O if necessary
Commit 5a498d4d06d6 ("drm/fbdev-dma: Only install deferred I/O if
necessary") initializes deferred I/O only if it is used.
drm_fbdev_dma_fb_destroy() however calls fb_deferred_io_cleanup()
unconditionally with struct fb_info.fbdefio == NULL. KASAN with the
out-of-tree Apple silicon display driver posts following warning from
__flush_work() of a random struct work_struct instead of the expected
NULL pointer derefs.
[ 22.053799] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 22.054832] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at kernel/workqueue.c:4177 __flush_work+0x4d8/0x580
[ 22.056597] Modules linked in: uhid bnep uinput nls_ascii ip6_tables ip_tables i2c_dev loop fuse dm_multipath nfnetlink zram hid_magicmouse btrfs xor xor_neon brcmfmac_wcc raid6_pq hci_bcm4377 bluetooth brcmfmac hid_apple brcmutil nvmem_spmi_mfd simple_mfd_spmi dockchannel_hid cfg80211 joydev regmap_spmi nvme_apple ecdh_generic ecc macsmc_hid rfkill dwc3 appledrm snd_soc_macaudio macsmc_power nvme_core apple_isp phy_apple_atc apple_sart apple_rtkit_helper apple_dockchannel tps6598x macsmc_hwmon snd_soc_cs42l84 videobuf2_v4l2 spmi_apple_controller nvmem_apple_efuses videobuf2_dma_sg apple_z2 videobuf2_memops spi_nor panel_summit videobuf2_common asahi videodev pwm_apple apple_dcp snd_soc_apple_mca apple_admac spi_apple clk_apple_nco i2c_pasemi_platform snd_pcm_dmaengine mc i2c_pasemi_core mux_core ofpart adpdrm drm_dma_helper apple_dart apple_soc_cpufreq leds_pwm phram
[ 22.073768] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 6.11.2-asahi+ #asahi-dev
[ 22.075612] Hardware name: Apple MacBook Pro (13-inch, M2, 2022) (DT)
[ 22.077032] pstate: 01400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 22.078567] pc : __flush_work+0x4d8/0x580
[ 22.079471] lr : __flush_work+0x54/0x580
[ 22.080345] sp : ffffc000836ef820
[ 22.081089] x29: ffffc000836ef880 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff80002ddb7128
[ 22.082678] x26: dfffc00000000000 x25: 1ffff000096f0c57 x24: ffffc00082d3e358
[ 22.084263] x23: ffff80004b7862b8 x22: dfffc00000000000 x21: ffff80005aa1d470
[ 22.085855] x20: ffff80004b786000 x19: ffff80004b7862a0 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 22.087439] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000005
[ 22.089030] x14: 1ffff800106ddf0a x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 22.090618] x11: ffffb800106ddf0f x10: dfffc00000000000 x9 : 1ffff800106ddf0e
[ 22.092206] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa x6 : 0000000000000001
[ 22.093790] x5 : ffffc000836ef728 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000020
[ 22.095368] x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 00000000000000aa x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 22.096955] Call trace:
[ 22.097505] __flush_work+0x4d8/0x580
[ 22.098330] flush_delayed_work+0x80/0xb8
[ 22.099231] fb_deferred_io_cleanup+0x3c/0x130
[ 22.100217] drm_fbdev_dma_fb_destroy+0x6c/0xe0 [drm_dma_helper]
[ 22.101559] unregister_framebuffer+0x210/0x2f0
[ 22.102575] drm_fb_helper_unregister_info+0x48/0x60
[ 22.103683] drm_fbdev_dma_client_unregister+0x4c/0x80 [drm_dma_helper]
[ 22.105147] drm_client_dev_unregister+0x1cc/0x230
[ 22.106217] drm_dev_unregister+0x58/0x570
[ 22.107125] apple_drm_unbind+0x50/0x98 [appledrm]
[ 22.108199] component_del+0x1f8/0x3a8
[ 22.109042] dcp_platform_shutdown+0x24/0x38 [apple_dcp]
[ 22.110357] platform_shutdown+0x70/0x90
[ 22.111219] device_shutdown+0x368/0x4d8
[ 22.112095] kernel_restart+0x6c/0x1d0
[ 22.112946] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x1c8/0x328
[ 22.113868] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x1a8
[ 22.114703] do_el0_svc+0x124/0x1a0
[ 22.115498] el0_svc+0x3c/0xe0
[ 22.116181] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xc0
[ 22.117110] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
[ 22.117931] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix lacks of icsk_syn_mss with IPPROTO_SMC
Eric report a panic on IPPROTO_SMC, and give the facts
that when INET_PROTOSW_ICSK was set, icsk->icsk_sync_mss must be set too.
Bug: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
0000000000000000
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000086000005
EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000001195d1000
[0000000000000000] pgd=0800000109c46003, p4d=0800000109c46003,
pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 8037 Comm: syz.3.265 Not tainted
6.11.0-rc7-syzkaller-g5f5673607153 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 08/06/2024
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : 0x0
lr : cipso_v4_sock_setattr+0x2a8/0x3c0 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c:1910
sp : ffff80009b887a90
x29: ffff80009b887aa0 x28: ffff80008db94050 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 1fffe0001aa6f5b3 x25: dfff800000000000 x24: ffff0000db75da00
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff0000d8b78518 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff0000d537ad80 x19: ffff0000d8b78000 x18: 1fffe000366d79ee
x17: ffff8000800614a8 x16: ffff800080569b84 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 000000008b336894 x13: 00000000cd96feaa x12: 0000000000000003
x11: 0000000000040000 x10: 00000000000020a3 x9 : 1fffe0001b16f0f1
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000002 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000d8b78000
Call trace:
0x0
netlbl_sock_setattr+0x2e4/0x338 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1000
smack_netlbl_add+0xa4/0x154 security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2593
smack_socket_post_create+0xa8/0x14c security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2973
security_socket_post_create+0x94/0xd4 security/security.c:4425
__sock_create+0x4c8/0x884 net/socket.c:1587
sock_create net/socket.c:1622 [inline]
__sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1659 [inline]
__sys_socket+0x134/0x340 net/socket.c:1706
__do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1720 [inline]
__se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1718 [inline]
__arm64_sys_socket+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1718
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? (????????)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This patch add a toy implementation that performs a simple return to
prevent such panic. This is because MSS can be set in sock_create_kern
or smc_setsockopt, similar to how it's done in AF_SMC. However, for
AF_SMC, there is currently no way to synchronize MSS within
__sys_connect_file. This toy implementation lays the groundwork for us
to support such feature for IPPROTO_SMC in the future. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/ct: prevent UAF in send_recv()
Ensure we serialize with completion side to prevent UAF with fence going
out of scope on the stack, since we have no clue if it will fire after
the timeout before we can erase from the xa. Also we have some dependent
loads and stores for which we need the correct ordering, and we lack the
needed barriers. Fix this by grabbing the ct->lock after the wait, which
is also held by the completion side.
v2 (Badal):
- Also print done after acquiring the lock and seeing timeout.
(cherry picked from commit 52789ce35c55ccd30c4b67b9cc5b2af55e0122ea) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: fnic: Move flush_work initialization out of if block
After commit 379a58caa199 ("scsi: fnic: Move fnic_fnic_flush_tx() to a
work queue"), it can happen that a work item is sent to an uninitialized
work queue. This may has the effect that the item being queued is never
actually queued, and any further actions depending on it will not
proceed.
The following warning is observed while the fnic driver is loaded:
kernel: WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 0 at ../kernel/workqueue.c:1524 __queue_work+0x373/0x410
kernel: <IRQ>
kernel: queue_work_on+0x3a/0x50
kernel: fnic_wq_copy_cmpl_handler+0x54a/0x730 [fnic 62fbff0c42e7fb825c60a55cde2fb91facb2ed24]
kernel: fnic_isr_msix_wq_copy+0x2d/0x60 [fnic 62fbff0c42e7fb825c60a55cde2fb91facb2ed24]
kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x36/0x1a0
kernel: handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x70
kernel: handle_irq_event+0x34/0x60
kernel: handle_edge_irq+0x7e/0x1a0
kernel: __common_interrupt+0x3b/0xb0
kernel: common_interrupt+0x58/0xa0
kernel: </IRQ>
It has been observed that this may break the rediscovery of Fibre
Channel devices after a temporary fabric failure.
This patch fixes it by moving the work queue initialization out of
an if block in fnic_probe(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: Remove LED entry from LEDs list on unregister
Commit c938ab4da0eb ("net: phy: Manual remove LEDs to ensure correct
ordering") correctly fixed a problem with using devm_ but missed
removing the LED entry from the LEDs list.
This cause kernel panic on specific scenario where the port for the PHY
is torn down and up and the kmod for the PHY is removed.
On setting the port down the first time, the assosiacted LEDs are
correctly unregistered. The associated kmod for the PHY is now removed.
The kmod is now added again and the port is now put up, the associated LED
are registered again.
On putting the port down again for the second time after these step, the
LED list now have 4 elements. With the first 2 already unregistered
previously and the 2 new one registered again.
This cause a kernel panic as the first 2 element should have been
removed.
Fix this by correctly removing the element when LED is unregistered. |
