| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The Block Bad Bots and Stop Bad Bots Crawlers and Spiders and Anti Spam Protection plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the stopbadbots_get_ajax_data() function in all versions up to, and including, 10.23. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to expose visitor data. |
| The List categories plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'categories' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 0.4 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. |
| The Visual Portfolio, Photo Gallery & Post Grid plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the ‘title_tag’ parameter in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.2 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. |
| The Advanced iFrame plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the ‘add_iframe_url_as_param_direct’ parameter in versions up to, and including, 2024.3 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level permissions and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU CR40 (6ES7288-1CR40-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU CR60 (6ES7288-1CR60-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR20 (6ES7288-1SR20-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR20 (6ES7288-1SR20-0AA1) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR30 (6ES7288-1SR30-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR30 (6ES7288-1SR30-0AA1) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR40 (6ES7288-1SR40-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR40 (6ES7288-1SR40-0AA1) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR60 (6ES7288-1SR60-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU SR60 (6ES7288-1SR60-0AA1) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST20 (6ES7288-1ST20-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST20 (6ES7288-1ST20-0AA1) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST30 (6ES7288-1ST30-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST30 (6ES7288-1ST30-0AA1) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST40 (6ES7288-1ST40-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST40 (6ES7288-1ST40-0AA1) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST60 (6ES7288-1ST60-0AA0) (All versions), SIMATIC S7-200 SMART CPU ST60 (6ES7288-1ST60-0AA1) (All versions). Affected devices do not properly handle TCP packets with an incorrect structure. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service condition. To restore normal operations, the network cable of the device needs to be unplugged and re-plugged. |
| Command injection in the <redacted> parameter of a <redacted>.exe request leads to remote code execution as the root user.
This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC models before version 24120701.
Likelihood: Moderate – This action is not a common place for command injection vulnerabilities to occur. Thus, an attacker will likely only be able to find this vulnerability by reverse-engineering the firmware or trying it on all <redacted> fields. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a payload.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services.
CVSS clarification. The attack can be executed over any network connection the station is listening to and serves the web interface (AV:N), and there are no additional security measure sin place that need to be circumvented (AC:L), the attack does not rely on preconditions (AT:N). The attack does require authentication, but the level of authentication is irrelevant (PR:L), it does not require user interaction (UI:N). If is a full system compromise, potentially fully compromising confidentiality, integrity and availability of the devicer (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H). A compromised charger can be used to "pivot" onto networks that should otherwise be closed, cause a low confidentiality and interity impact on subsequent systems. (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Because this device is an EV charger handing significant amounts of power, we suspect this vulnerability can have a safety impact (S:P). The attack can be automated (AU:Y). |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root
This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701
Likelihood: Moderate – The <redacted> binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete
files and services. |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root
This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.
Likelihood: Moderate – The <redacted> binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete
files and services.
CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y). |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability in Iocharger firmware for AC models allows OS Command Injection as root
This issue affects all Iocharger AC EV charger models on a firmware version before 25010801.
Likelihood: Moderate – The <redacted> binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the <redacted> binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete
files and services.
CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y). |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root
This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.
Likelihood: Moderate – The attacker will first need to find the name of the script, and needs a (low privilege) account to gain access to the script, or convince a user with such access to execute a request to it.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and deletefiles and services.
CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y). |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root
This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.
Likelihood: Moderate – It might be difficult for an attacker to identify the file structure of the <redated> directory, and then modify the backup to add a new CGI script in the correct directory. Furthermore, the attacker will need an account to restore the settings backup, or convince a user with such access to upload a modified backup file.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and deletefiles and services.
CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y). |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root
This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.
Likelihood: High. However, the attacker will need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the action.exe CGI binary and upload the crafted firmware file, or convince a user with such access to upload it.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and deletefiles and services.
CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y). |
| Software installed and run as a non-privileged user may conduct improper GPU system calls to achieve unauthorised reads and writes of physical memory from the GPU HW. |
| After gaining access to the firmware of a charging station, a file at <redacted> can be accessed to obtain default credentials that are the same across all Iocharger AC model EV chargers.
This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC models before firmware version 25010801.
The issue is addressed by requiring a mandatory password change on first login, it is still recommended to change the password on older models.
Likelihood: Moderate – The attacker will first have to abuse a code execution or file inclusion vulnerability (for example by using <redacted>.sh) to gain access to the <redacted>.json file, or obtain a firmware dump of the charging station or obtain the firmware via other channels.
Impact: Critical – All chargers using Iocharger firmware for AC models started with the same initial password. For models with firmware version before 25010801 a password change was not mandatory. It is therefore very likely that this firmware password is still active on many chargers. These credentials could, once obtained, allow an attacker to log into many Iocharger charging station, and allow them to execute arbitrary commands via the System → Custom page.
CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, and requires high privileges (PR:H), there is no user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a compromised of the confidentialy of the "super user" credentials of the device (VC:H/VI:N/VA:N), and can subsequently be used to full compromise and other devices (SC:H/SI:H/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y). |
| The CGI script <redacted>.sh can be used to download any file on the filesystem.
This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers beforeversion 24120701.
Likelihood: High, but credentials required.
Impact: Critical – The script can be used to download any file on the filesystem, including sensitive files such as /etc/shadow, the CGI script source code or binaries and configuration files.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/S:P/AU:Y
CVSS clarification. The attack can be executed over any network connection the station is listening to and serves the web interface (AV:N), and there are no additional security measure sin place that need to be circumvented (AC:L), the attack does not rely on preconditions (AT:N). The attack does require authentication, but the level of authentication is irrelevant (PR:L), it does not require user interaction (UI:N). The confidentiality of all files of the devicd can be compromised (VC:H/VI:N/VA:N). There is no impact on subsequent systems. (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). While this device is an EV charger handing significant amounts of power, this attack in isolation does not have a safety impact. The attack can be automated (AU:Y). |
| The <redacted>.so library, which is used by <redacted>, is
vulnerable to a buffer overflow in the code that handles the deletion
of certificates. This buffer overflow can be triggered by providing a
long file path to the <redacted> action of the <redacted>.exe CGI binary or
to the <redacted>.sh CGI script. This binary or script will write this
file path to <redacted>, which is then
read by <redacted>.so
This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC models before version 24120701.
Likelihood: Moderate – An attacker will have to find this exploit by
either obtaining the binaries involved in this vulnerability, or by trial
and error. Furthermore, the attacker will need a (low privilege)
account to gain access to the <redacted>.exe CGI binary or <redacted>.sh
script to trigger the vulnerability, or convince a user with such access
send an HTTP request that triggers it.
Impact: High – The <redacted> process, which we assume is
responsible for OCPP communication, will keep crashing after
performing the exploit. This happens because the buffer overflow
causes the process to segfault before
<redacted> is removed. This means that,
even though <redacted> is automatically restarted, it will crash
again as soon as it tries to parse the text file.
CVSS clarification. The attack can be executed over any network connection the station is listening to and serves the web interface (AV:N), and there are no additional security measure sin place that need to be circumvented (AC:L), the attack does not rely on preconditions (AT:N). The attack does require authentication, but the level of authentication is irrelevant (PR:L), it does not require user interaction (UI:N). The attack leads to reducred availability of the device (VC:N/VI:N/VA:H). THere is not impact on subsequent systems. (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). Alltough this device is an EV charger handing significant amounts of power, we do not forsee a safety impact. The attack can be automated (AU:Y). Because the DoS condition is written to disk persistantly, it cannot be recovered by the user (R:I). |
| There are many buffer overflow vulnerabilities present in several CGI binaries of the charging station.This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers beforeversion 24120701.
Likelihood: High – Given the prevalence of these buffer overflows, and the clear error message of the web server, an attacker is very likely to be able to find these vulnerabilities.
Impact: Low – Usually, overflowing one of these buffers just causes a segmentation fault of the CGI binary, which causes the web server to return a 502 Bad Gateway error. However the webserver itself is not affected, and no DoS can be achieved. Abusing these buffer overflows in a meaningful way requires highly technical knowledge, especially since ASLR also seems to be enabled on the charging station. However, a skilled attacker might be able to use one of these buffer overflows to obtain remote code execution.
CVSS clarification. The attack can be executed over any network connection the station is listening to and serves the web interface (AV:N), and there are no additional security measure sin place that need to be circumvented (AC:L), the attack does not rely on preconditions (AT:N). The attack does require authentication, but the level of authentication is irrelevant (PR:L), it does not require user interaction (UI:N). The attack has a small impact on the availability of the device (VC:N/VI:N/VA:L). There is no impact on subsequent systems. (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). While this device is an EV charger handing significant amounts of power, we do not expect this vulnerability to have a safety impact. The attack can be automated (AU:Y). |
| cron/entry.c in vixie cron before 9cc8ab1, as used in OpenBSD 7.4 and 7.5, allows a heap-based buffer underflow and memory corruption. NOTE: this issue was introduced during a May 2023 refactoring. |
| ### Impact
When this library is used to deserialize messagepack data from an untrusted source, there is a risk of a denial of service attack by an attacker that sends data contrived to produce hash collisions, leading to large CPU consumption disproportionate to the size of the data being deserialized.
This is similar to [a prior advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf), which provided an inadequate fix for the hash collision part of the vulnerability.
### Patches
The following steps are required to mitigate this risk.
1. Upgrade to a version of the library where a fix is available.
1. Review the steps in [this previous advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf) to ensure you have your application configured for untrusted data.
### Workarounds
If upgrading MessagePack to a patched version is not an option for you, you may apply a manual workaround as follows:
1. Declare a class that derives from `MessagePackSecurity`.
2. Override the `GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>` method to provide a collision-resistant hash function of your own and avoid calling `base.GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>()`.
3. Configure a `MessagePackSerializerOptions` with an instance of your derived type by calling `WithSecurity` on an existing options object.
4. Use your custom options object for all deserialization operations. This may be by setting the `MessagePackSerializer.DefaultOptions` static property, if you call methods that rely on this default property, and/or by passing in the options object explicitly to any `Deserialize` method.
### References
- Learn more about best security practices when reading untrusted data with [MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security) or [MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp#security).
- The .NET team's [discussion on hash collision vulnerabilities of their `HashCode` struct](https://github.com/GrabYourPitchforks/runtime/blob/threat_models/docs/design/security/System.HashCode.md).
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* [Start a public discussion](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/discussions)
* [Email us privately](mailto:andrewarnott@live.com) |
| An information disclosure flaw was found in OpenShift's internal image registry operator. The AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET can be exposed through an environment variable defined in the pod definition, but is limited to Azure environments. An attacker controlling an account that has high enough permissions to obtain pod information from the openshift-image-registry namespace could use this obtained client secret to perform actions as the registry operator's Azure service account. |
