| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.6.1 and iPadOS 26.6.1, macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2, tvOS 27, visionOS 27, watchOS 27. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or corrupt kernel memory. |
| A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 27 and iPadOS 27, macOS Golden Gate 27, macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8. An app may be able to cause a denial of service. |
| In gmc_phy_lp3_exit_restore_registers of phy_power.c, there is a possible escalation of privilege due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In get_global_config_item_addr of gc.c, there is a possible out-of-bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In Vp9DecEndOfStream of vp9hwd_output.cc, there is a possible out-of-bounds read due to an incorrect bounds check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In DecodeFilmGrainParams of film_grain_dec.cc, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In gf_ta_test_set_config of gf_ta_test.c, there is a possible heap buffer overflow due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In multiple functions of physmem_extmem_linux.c, there is a possible out-of-bounds read due to uninitialized data. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: vnifilter: enforce exact length of GROUP/GROUP6 attributes
The VXLAN VNI filter entry policy declares the GROUP/GROUP6 address
attributes as NLA_BINARY with only a maximum length, so validate_nla()
accepts a payload shorter than the address. The GROUP consumer reads it
with nla_get_in_addr(), an unconditional 4-byte load, so a short
attribute over-reads up to 3 bytes of uninitialised slab data, which are
stored into remote_ip and echoed back via RTM_GETTUNNEL, disclosing
kernel memory.
Switch both entries to NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() so the validator rejects
any GROUP/GROUP6 that is not exactly 4 / 16 bytes; a valid address is
always sent at full width. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: dapm: Fix off-by-one check on the second enum channel
The snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double() rejects item[0] once it reaches
e->items, but it lets item[1] be equal to it. Both go on to
snd_soc_enum_item_to_val(), which indexes e->values with no bound of
its own, so an enum with a value table reads one element past the end.
The indexing arrived with the MUX consolidation, which relaxed the
item[1] check in the same hunk. The value MUX handler it deleted used
>= there, and the snd_soc_put_enum_double() in soc-ops.c still does.
Only adav80x pairs a value table with two shifts, and its second
channel looks accidental, but the control does report two values.
Writing three into it reads off the end of adav80x_mux_values. The
core catches that only under CONFIG_SND_CTL_INPUT_VALIDATION, which
defaults off. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: fix out-of-bounds page array access on empty zisofs block
zisofs_uncompress_block()'s empty-block fast path returns
pcount << PAGE_SHIFT, ignoring the incoming poffset, unlike the
decompression path which returns bytes produced relative to poffset.
zisofs_fill_pages() uses that return to advance its page cursor, so when
the zisofs block size is below PAGE_SIZE and a sub-page block leaves
poffset partway into a page, a following empty block over-counts and
advances pages[] one element past its end, after which
"if (poffset && *pages)" reads pages[1] out of bounds. rock.c only
rejects a block-size shift > 17, so a crafted "ZF" Rock Ridge record can
set it below PAGE_SHIFT; the bug is reached by an ordinary read() of a
compressed file on such a mounted ISO9660 image.
Return the byte count relative to poffset and zero only
[poffset, PAGE_SIZE) of the first page, matching the decompression path.
The page-aligned case (poffset == 0) is unaffected.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in zisofs_read_folio (fs/isofs/compress.c:290)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800f5eac48 by task exploit/142
zisofs_read_folio (fs/isofs/compress.c:290)
read_pages (mm/readahead.c:184)
...
filemap_read (mm/filemap.c:2814)
vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:574)
__x64_sys_pread64 (fs/read_write.c:769)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of the
allocated 8-byte region in the kmalloc-8 cache |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate ef->size covers the record's name and value
When an EA record has a non-zero ef->size, ntfs_read_ea() only checks
that the record fits in the remaining buffer (ea_size > bytes), not that
ef->size is large enough to hold the record's own name_len + 1 + elength.
A crafted image can pass validation with, e.g., ef->size = 24 but
elength = 0xffff. ntfs_get_ea() then trusts elength and copies it out of
the undersized record, reading past the kmalloc(info->size) allocation
and leaking heap memory to userspace via getxattr():
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ntfs_get_ea (fs/ntfs3/xattr.c:302)
Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888100794550 by task exploit
__asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)
ntfs_get_ea (fs/ntfs3/xattr.c:302)
ntfs_getxattr (fs/ntfs3/xattr.c:848)
__vfs_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:441)
vfs_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:474)
do_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:800)
path_getxattrat (fs/xattr.c:868)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
The buggy address is located 80 bytes inside of
allocated 84-byte region in cache kmalloc-96
Compute the size the record needs and require ef->size to cover it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read of INDEX_ROOT in reparse/objid init
ntfs_reparse_init() and ntfs_objid_init() parse the index root of the
$Extend/$Reparse and $Extend/$ObjId metafiles (the INDEX_ROOT attributes
named $R and $O). They read its type and rule fields through
resident_data(), which does not check that the resident attribute is
large enough to hold them.
mi_enum_attr() accepts a resident attribute with data_off == asize and
data_size == 0. For such an attribute placed last in its MFT record,
resident_data() returns a pointer to the end of the record_size buffer,
so reading root->type / root->rule reads past the allocation.
Use resident_data_ex(attr, sizeof(struct INDEX_ROOT)) and bail out when
it returns NULL, as ntfs_security_init() already does for $SDH / $SII.
The attribute is only parsed while mounting a crafted image, so this
needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ntfs_reparse_init (fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:2306)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801219dc00 by task mount
ntfs_reparse_init (fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:2306)
ntfs_fill_super (fs/ntfs3/super.c:1604)
get_tree_bdev_flags (fs/super.c:1703)
vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1758)
path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4131)
__x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4360) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning
ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the
synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers
clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()
currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no
storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT
write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report
a slab OOB write.
Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,
copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the
existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize
because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix password encoding bounds check
The password PSWD_ENCODINGS parser reads password_obj[elem + pos_values]
while copying the supported password encodings from the ACPI package.
The outer loop only guarantees that elem is within password_obj_count.
The encoding count is bounded by MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE, but that does not
guarantee that the ACPI package contains enough entries for all
elem + pos_values accesses.
A malformed package can therefore declare a non-zero encoding count
without providing enough string objects, causing the parser to read past
the ACPI package array and pass an out-of-bounds string pointer and
length to hp_convert_hexstr_to_str().
Add the same computed-index bounds check used by the other offset-based
package parsing loops before reading password_obj[elem + pos_values]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()
ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC
login response with
user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz;
user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (user->passkey)
memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz);
resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is
only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login
response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy()
reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not
bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack
hash[] buffer before allocating and copying.
[ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611
[ 2030.242296]
[ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
[ 2030.242763] Call Trace:
[ 2030.242769] <TASK>
[ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0
[ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200
[ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70
[ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150
[ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0
[ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70
[ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120
[ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00
[ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0
[ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140
[ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0
[ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300
[ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0
[ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280
[ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490
[ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300
[ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110
[ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20
[ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470
[ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910
[ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0
[ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 2030.243564] </TASK>
[ 2030.243570]
[ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279:
[ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
[ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0
[ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750
[ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340
[ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0
[ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0
[ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40
[ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930
[ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00
[ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140
[ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470
[ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100
[ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460
[ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 2030.305594]
[ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640
[ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 2030.309595] The buggy address
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-integrity: fix buffer overflow with keyed discard
Since commit 68c5c42567bc ("dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard
filler with a keyed sector marker"), integrity_metadata computes a
checksum for every discarded block into the "checksums" buffer.
integrity_sector_checksum always writes the whole digest. So if the tag
size is smaller than the digest size, the checksum of the last block
that fits into the buffer is written past the end of it. For example,
with hmac(sha256) and tag size 16, a 4MiB discard writes 16 bytes past
the kmalloc'ed page.
Fix this by subtracting extra_space from the buffer size when computing
max_blocks, like we do for writes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qlcnic: validate unified ROM sections before loading
The unified ROM parser reads directory, product, and data-descriptor fields
from the firmware file. Existing validation forms table and data ends with
unchecked additions and multiplications. Malformed values can wrap before
they are compared with the firmware size. The parser also dereferences
typed pointers at firmware-controlled offsets.
Valid descriptor extents alone are insufficient for the consumers. The
loader reads a fixed-size bootloader regardless of its declared size, the
version parser assumes a 17-byte tail, and a partial final firmware word is
read as a full u64. A truncated image can therefore make the driver read
beyond the firmware allocation during validation or loading.
Replace the pointer-returning parser with bounded range helpers. Validate
table entry sizes, descriptor indices, section ranges, the fixed
bootloader load length, and the version tail before exposing any section.
Read all file fields with unaligned little-endian accessors and assemble a
partial final word from only the bytes that remain. Apply the same range
checks to the legacy image before reading its fixed fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hinic3: Fix skb linearization mismatch and drop skb when skb_checksum_help() failed
Previously, hinic3_send_one_skb() cached the skb fragment count before
calling hinic3_tx_offload(). If hinic3_tx_csum() falls back to
skb_checksum_help() for unsupported tunnel packets, the skb may be
linearized. Continuing to build the TX descriptor with the stale
fragment count leads to a descriptor mismatch, which can trigger
out-of-bounds DMA reads or IOMMU faults.
Furthermore, the old code ignored the return value of skb_checksum_help(),
transmitting corrupted packets with incomplete checksums upon failure.
Fix this by:
1. Moving the hinic3_tx_offload() call before calculating 'num_sge' to
ensure the correct fragment count is used if the SKB is linearized.
2. Propagating skb_checksum_help() errors and returning
HINIC3_TX_OFFLOAD_INVALID to properly drop the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate orphan slot during inode read
Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read".
OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes.
A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local
system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is
reported.
Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing.
Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and
orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode
validation boundary.
This patch (of 2):
[BUG]
A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an
i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range.
ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking
up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves
the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers
assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing. |
