| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A MongoDB driver component could write sensitive configuration information, including a credential used for outbound network connectivity, to application log output in cleartext during routine client initialization. This occurs automatically as part of normal operation and requires no special privileges to trigger. A party able to read the affected application's logs or downstream log-aggregation storage could recover the credential and reuse it to authenticate to the associated network infrastructure. This issue affects confidentiality only. |
| Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') in Azure Arc allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| Missing authentication for critical function in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: initialize policy rwsem before sysfs publication
cpufreq_policy_alloc() initializes policy->rwsem after
kobject_init_and_add() has created the policy sysfs directory and its
default attributes. A sysfs access can therefore reach a policy callback
before the semaphore has been initialized.
Initialize policy->rwsem before publishing the policy kobject so sysfs
callbacks always see an initialized semaphore. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: zero-initialize policy cpumask before sysfs publication
cpufreq_policy_alloc() allocates policy->cpus with alloc_cpumask_var(),
i.e. without __GFP_ZERO, unlike the sibling related_cpus and real_cpus
masks. With CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y the mask is a separate
kmalloc_node() allocation, so its bitmap holds whatever the slab allocator
left behind:
cpufreq_online()
cpufreq_policy_alloc()
alloc_cpumask_var(&policy->cpus) /* bitmap is uninitialized */
kobject_init_and_add() /* policy%u/ appears in sysfs */
cpufreq_policy_online()
cpumask_copy(policy->cpus, cpumask_of(cpu)) /* first valid value */
This leaves a window in which the sysfs attributes are already reachable
while policy->cpus is still garbage. show()/store() gate on
policy_is_inactive(), i.e. cpumask_empty(policy->cpus), so a non-zero
bitmap makes them run the attribute callbacks on a policy that is not
initialized yet.
Fix this by using zalloc_cpumask_var() for policy->cpus. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: Don't leak return code when parsing firmware format v2
When key_id from chip is zero, rtlbt_parse_firmware_v2() intentionally
ignores all security headers. However, the implementation simply breaks
from a switch statement and leaks uninitialized return code `rc' (if the
first section is a security one) or the previous section's `rc'.
Fix it by really skipping a loop with `continue'. For consistency and
readability, also do the same for the default case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: sti: initialize IRQ lock before requesting IRQ
uni_reader_init() registers the shared IRQ before initializing
reader->irq_lock. A pending interrupt can invoke the handler while the
lock is still uninitialized.
Initialize the lock before registering the IRQ so the interrupt path
always sees valid lock state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel: ethosu: Fix ethosu_job_open() return value
A WARN_ON() returns a 0 or 1, not the original negative errno. Just drop
the WARN_ON() as the FD open will pass the return code to userspace and
there's only one possible source of the error (drm_sched_entity_init()). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
create_var_ref() allocates a VAR_REF hist_field and then calls
init_var_ref() to fill it in. When that fails the field is leaked.
commit 656fe2ba85e8 ("tracing: Use hist trigger's var_ref array to destroy
var_refs") made destroy_hist_field() return early for
HIST_FIELD_FL_VAR_REF, since var refs are freed by walking the trigger's
var_refs[] array instead. create_var_ref() adds the field to that array
only after init_var_ref() has succeeded, so on this path the field is in
neither place and nothing frees it. The call was correct when it was
written, before var refs were taken out of destroy_hist_field().
init_var_ref() cannot free it either. The caller owns the field, so
init_var_ref() undoes only its own string allocations and leaves the
field alone. Freeing it there would leave create_var_ref() passing freed
memory to destroy_hist_field(), which reads its flags.
Call __destroy_hist_field(), which frees the field without consulting
the flag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/user_events: Don't destroy fields when event removal fails
destroy_user_event() destroys the event's fields before attempting to
remove the trace event call. If user_event_set_call_visible() fails,
e.g. because the event is still enabled and trace_remove_event_call()
returns -EBUSY, the event is left registered with an irreversibly
destroyed field list. Any subsequent interaction with the event then
operates on an empty field list while it is still fully visible in
tracefs.
Move the field destruction after the call removal, and splice the
field list back onto the event when the removal fails so the event
remains in a consistent state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vduse: return compat ioctl results directly
The compat handler handles VDUSE_IOTLB_GET_FD and VDUSE_VQ_GET_INFO, but
then calls the native handler. Their different command sizes make native
dispatch return -ENOIOCTLCMD.
For GET_FD, this overwrites receive_fd()'s return value after the
descriptor is installed, leaking one fd per call. Return handled compat
results directly and use native dispatch only for other commands. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU
This commit bounds cork->base.fragsize to IP6_MAX_MTU for UDP sockets to
avoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in
udp_set_len_short when setsockopt IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER is set to
IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO or IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over
a netdev with an unusually large MTU.
Steps to reproduce (included in the new selftest):
1. Set device MTU bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU. cork->base.fragsize will be
set to that MTU in ip6_setup_cork.
2. Set IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER to IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE or IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO. It
lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork->fragsize) in
__ip6_append_data, rather than to IP6_MAX_MTU.
3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +40 bytes of
IPv6 header). Device MTU allows it (it's only one byte bigger than
IP6_MAX_MTU, and the device MTU is bigger than that).
4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the
16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short.
To avoid breaking sending UDP jumbograms over raw IPv6 sockets, limit
the change to UDP sockets only.
The original overflow bug with IPv6 and IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO seems to
predate git history (verified reproduction on 2.6.21), was fixed later,
and then reappeared in commit 427faee167bc ("net: ipv6: introduce
ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), which is chosen as the Fixes tag here. The
overflow with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE reproduces since its introduction in
commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost: invalidate vring access on IOTLB transitions
When VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM changes, cached vring pointers and IOTLB
metadata are interpreted in a different address space. Keeping them
across the transition can leave stale ring mappings in use.
Clearing d->iotlb before taking the VQ locks also lets a worker observe
a transient NULL d->iotlb and fall back to d->umem while translating a
descriptor.
Add a common vhost_clear_device_iotlb() helper for vhost-net and
vhost-vsock. Take all VQ mutexes in index order before dropping the
device-wide IOTLB, invalidate each VQ's cached ring access and metadata,
clear pending IOTLB messages, and free the old table after the handoff.
This serializes the transition with workers and prevents mixed address
space mappings.
On the first direct-to-IOTLB transition, invalidate the cached vring
addresses. When an existing device IOTLB is replaced, preserve the
GIOVA ring addresses and reset only the metadata cache. After clearing
ACCESS_PLATFORM, userspace must configure the vring addresses for the
new address mode.
vhost_vq_invalidate_access() clears desc, avail, and used together.
Treat the VQ as invalidated only when all three are NULL, since a single
GIOVA address may legitimately be zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vduse: validate virtqueue alignment
vduse_validate_config() only checks the upper bound of vq_align. Invalid
values can therefore reach vring_create_virtqueue_map(). The split-ring
helpers use align - 1 as a bit mask, so the alignment must be a non-zero
power of two. A zero value makes vring_size() drop the descriptor and
available-ring part and vring_init() leave the used ring pointer NULL.
The VIRTIO spec requires the used ring to start at an address
aligned to at least 4 bytes. Reject values below VRING_USED_ALIGN_SIZE as
well as non-power-of-two values before they reach the virtio ring helpers.
Opening a virtio-net device created with vq_align=0 triggered:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in virtqueue_kick_prepare_split+0xe3/0x100
Read of size 2 at addr 0000000000000000 by task systemd-network/1062
Call Trace (relevant frames):
dump_stack_lvl
print_report
kasan_report
__asan_load2
virtqueue_kick_prepare_split+0xe3/0x100
virtqueue_kick_prepare+0x40/0x60
try_fill_recv+0x857/0x1250
virtnet_open+0x189/0x460
__dev_open+0x225/0x390
__dev_change_flags+0x368/0x3b0
netif_change_flags+0x56/0xc0
do_setlink.isra.0+0x68c/0x1e30
Validate the value before it reaches the virtio ring helpers. |
