| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix DMA buffer out-of-bounds write when fill_max is set
When a USB audio endpoint requests full packet transfers via the fill_max
descriptor flag, data_ep_set_params() promotes ep->curpacksize to
ep->maxpacksize. However, maxsize is left at the original sample-rate
derived value.
Since u->buffer_size is allocated as maxsize * packets, the resulting
DMA buffer is far too small for the requested transfer length. When the
USB host controller streams up to curpacksize bytes per packet, it writes
past the end of the buffer via DMA, corrupting kernel heap memory.
Update maxsize to curpacksize when fill_max is set so that the allocated
DMA buffer size matches the actual transfer request size.
[ changed to reassign maxsize only when ep->fill_max is set -- tiwai ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()
route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr))
(or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data.
However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so
skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20)
only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of
IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear
frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled
linear buffer length.
Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to
the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775-core) Fix number of temperature registers for NCT6116
Unlike NCT6106, NCT6116 only has three temperature registers, and with
it only three temperature source and temperature source configuration
registers. The register addresses match those of NCT6106 and can be
re-used.
The code used a separate array to list the temperature source registers
for NCT6116, but used the size of the NCT6106 register array to set
the number of registers. The NCT6106 register array provides six addresses,
while the temperature source register array for NCT6116 only provides three
addresses. This causes a KASAN report.
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nct6775_probe+0x936/0x46f0 [nct6775]
Read of size 2 at addr ffffffffc19561a6 by task modprobe/954
...
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x7d/0xa7
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1c/0x220
? __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc9/0xd0
? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x194/0x5b0
? nct6775_probe+0x936/0x46f0 [nct6775]
? nct6775_probe+0x936/0x46f0 [nct6775]
...
Fix the problem by hard-coding the number of temperature and temperature
configuration registers to three for NCT6116. Drop the unnecessary
NCT6116_REG_TEMP_SOURCE array and re-use NCT6106_REG_TEMP_SOURCE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix out-of-bounds clear_bit in ath12k_mac_dp_peer_cleanup()
ath12k_mac_dp_peer_cleanup() clears the ML peer ID slot on the
free_ml_peer_id_map bitmap by indexing it with dp_peer->peer_id. That is
wrong: dp_peer->peer_id for an MLO peer always carries the
ATH12K_PEER_ML_ID_VALID bit (BIT(13)), so clear_bit() is invoked with
index >= 0x2000, which is far outside the bitmap of ATH12K_MAX_MLO_PEERS
(256) bits and corrupts memory adjacent to ah->free_ml_peer_id_map. The
intended bitmap entry also never gets cleared, so subsequent
ath12k_peer_ml_alloc() calls eventually run out of IDs.
The ID without the VALID bit is what ath12k_peer_ml_alloc() returned and
is stored in ahsta->ml_peer_id. Use that instead.
While there, also reset ahsta->ml_peer_id to ATH12K_MLO_PEER_ID_INVALID so
the bitmap and ahsta->ml_peer_id stay in sync.
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c5-00302-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-1.115823.3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: widen NAT rewrite delta to s32 in sip_help_tcp()
sip_help_tcp() stores the size change of each NAT-rewritten SIP message
in s16 diff and accumulates it in s16 tdiff, but a single message can
grow by more than S16_MAX while the packet stays under the 65535
enlarge_skb() limit: nf_nat_sip() rewrites every matching URI, and a long
Contact list expands the message by tens of kilobytes. diff then wraps,
and "datalen = datalen + diff - msglen" yields a huge unsigned datalen,
so the next iteration's ct_sip_get_header() reads past the linearized skb
tail.
Widen diff, tdiff and the seq_adjust hook to s32. Both are bounded by the
65535 byte packet limit, and the seqadj core is already s32
(nf_ct_seqadj_set() takes s32), so no previously accepted input is
rejected.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ct_sip_get_header (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c:464)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888010800000 by task ksoftirqd/1/25
ct_sip_get_header (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c:464)
sip_help_tcp (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c:1694)
nf_confirm (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:183)
nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
ip6_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:246)
ip6_forward (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:690)
ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351)
__netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6212)
process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6676)
__napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7735)
net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7955)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622)
run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:1076)
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/arm-smmu-v3-iommufd: Require exactly one Stream ID for a vDEVICE
arm_vsmmu_vsid_to_sid() maps a guest's vSID to a single physical Stream ID
taken from master->streams[0], assuming a device has exactly one stream. A
device with several streams gets only its first one mapped, so a guest vSID
invalidation cannot reach the others' ATC and IOTLB entries; a device with
none makes master->streams a ZERO_SIZE_PTR, read out of bounds.
Add an arm_vsmmu_vdevice_init() op to reject the vDEVICE with -EOPNOTSUPP
when master->num_streams is not one, rather than mapping it silently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: mm: Fix out-of-bounds page-table walk during memory hot-remove
remove_pud_mapping() and remove_p4d_mapping() obtain a child table base
with pud_offset(p4dp, 0) and p4d_offset(pgd, 0), then add the index for
addr.
RISC-V folds page-table levels at runtime. When a level is folded, its
offset helper returns the parent entry itself, but the index can still be
nonzero. Adding it walks past the parent table. Sv48 folds P4D, while Sv39
folds both P4D and PUD, so memory hot-remove can descend into unrelated
memory and pass an invalid page to __free_pages(). This can trigger:
kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1810!
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0)
arch_remove_memory+0x1e/0x5c
try_remove_memory+0x15e/0x200
remove_memory+0x24/0x3c
Only add the index when the corresponding page-table level is enabled,
matching p4d_offset() and pud_offset(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binfmt_misc: reject a flag character as the field delimiter
The registration string starts with a user chosen delimiter that
separates the individual fields. So that the field parsers terminate
even on a truncated string create_entry() pads the buffer with that
same delimiter:
memset(buf + count, del, 8);
Most fields are scanned for the delimiter with strchr()/scanarg() and
happily stop on the padding. The flags field is different: instead of
scanning for the delimiter check_special_flags() consumes the flag
characters 'P', 'O', 'C' and 'F' and stops at the first byte that is
none of them, relying on the trailing delimiter to end the scan.
If the delimiter is itself a flag character the padding no longer acts
as a terminator. The scan swallows all eight padding bytes and keeps
reading past the end of the allocation until it hits a byte that is
not a flag character. For example registering
PaPEPPxPPiP
with 'P' as the delimiter (name "a", type extension, magic "x",
interpreter "i", empty flags) leaves the flag scan running off the end
of the buffer. The registration is rejected in the end because the
parser does not stop exactly at buf + count, but only after the out of
bounds read has already happened. With an unlucky allocation layout the
scan can walk into an unmapped page; under KASAN it is reported as a
slab out of bounds read. binfmt_misc mounts are available to
unprivileged users in a user namespace so the read is reachable without
privileges.
Reject a delimiter that is one of the flag characters up front. Such a
registration was always rejected anyway, only after the out of bounds
read, so no valid registration string changes meaning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Clamp frame size in implicit-feedback mode
snd_usb_handle_sync_urb() scales received sync packet sizes by the sender's
stride and stores the result directly in out_packet->packet_size[i]. If a
connected USB device sends an oversized sync packet, this frame count can
exceed ep->maxframesize.
The un-clamped frame count then propagates to the playback endpoint queue,
potentially driving packet transfers beyond the endpoint's hardware frame
limits.
Cap the calculated frame count against ep->maxframesize in
snd_usb_handle_sync_urb() to prevent oversized packets from entering the
playback queue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (nct6775-core) Prevent access to unsupported weight registers
Sashiko reports:
During initialization of the nct6116 chip, the driver sets data->pwm_num
to 5. However, it assigns several NCT6106 register arrays (such as
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_DUTY_STEP, NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_SEL, and
NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_*) to data->REG_PWM and data->REG_WEIGHT_TEMP.
These arrays only contain 3 elements.
In nct6775_update_pwm(), the driver iterates up to data->pwm_num. If
data->has_pwm has bits 3 or 4 set (which is structurally possible for
nct6116), the loop attempts to read elements at index 3 and 4 from these
3-element arrays. This results in a global out-of-bounds read, which can
be caught by KASAN.
Furthermore, the driver uses these garbage out-of-bounds values as
hardware register addresses for subsequent read and write operations. This
leads to invalid hardware register access, potentially causing hardware
misconfiguration or system crashes.
The underlying problem is that the chip does support up to five fan
control channels, but only the first three support weight control.
Fix the problem by extending the affected weight register arrays with
zeroed fields. The driver uses zeroed register addresses to determine
if a register is supported or not, and skips accesses for unsupported
registers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Fix stale-data leak into the SCSI sense buffer
iscsi_scsi_cmd_rsp() copies the sense data of a SCSI Response from the
target-supplied data segment. The segment carries a 2-byte sense length
followed by the sense bytes, so it must hold 2 + senselen bytes, but the
bounds check only requires datalen >= senselen:
senselen = get_unaligned_be16(data);
if (datalen < senselen)
goto invalid_datalen;
memcpy(sc->sense_buffer, data + 2,
min_t(uint16_t, senselen, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE));
A target that returns a SCSI Response whose datalen equals senselen
(with senselen <= SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE) makes the memcpy() from data +
2 read up to two bytes past the received data. Those bytes are stale
conn->data contents and end up in the command's sense buffer, which is
returned to userspace.
Account for the 2-byte sense length prefix in the check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: drain continuation descs after overflow in xsk_build_skb()
Fix generic xmit path multi-buffer logic when packets are either too big
(count of descriptors exceed MAX_SKB_FRAGS) or an invalid descriptor is
included in fragmented packet. Introduce xdp_sock::drain_cont and act
upon this flag - when it is set, keep on consuming descriptors from
AF_XDP Tx ring and put them directly onto Cq. Previously these
descriptors were silently lost and could never be reached again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: fix out-of-bounds read in keyring_get_key_chunk()
For description-level chunks keyring_get_key_chunk() advances the read
pointer by level * sizeof(long) past the inline prefix but only
bounds-checks the prefix, so a long enough key description is read past
its kmemdup(desc, desc_len + 1) allocation. Compute the full byte
offset and bounds-check the description against it before reading.
The walk only reaches a description-level chunk when two keys collide
through the hash, x, type and domain_tag chunks, so this is reached from
an unprivileged add_key(2) with a crafted pair of same-type keys whose
index hashes collide; KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel: Validate length before parsing diagnostics TLV
btintel_diagnostics() accesses tlv->val[0] without first validating
that the diagnostics VSE is long enough to contain that field, so
may cause reading data beyond the received frame.
Fix by validating the length before access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: validate uCAN receive record lengths
pcan_usb_fd_decode_buf() walks uCAN records packed in one USB
receive buffer.
Require each record to contain the fixed header for its type, and verify
CAN payload bytes before copying them into the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: kvaser_usb_leaf: kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd(): validate received command extents
The wait and bulk receive paths walk variable-length commands from a
USB buffer. A nonzero command shorter than CMD_HEADER_LEN can still be
dispatched, and the wait path copies a matching command into a fixed
caller-owned struct kvaser_cmd using the device-provided length.
Reject nonzero commands that do not contain the fixed header or that
extend beyond the current USB buffer item. In the wait path, also reject
a matching command that exceeds the destination before copying it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: prevent peer transport count overflow
sctp_assoc_add_peer() increments the association's 16-bit transport_count
for every new unique peer. Adding the 65,536th transport wraps the count to
zero.
SCTP sock_diag uses transport_count to reserve the INET_DIAG_PEERS payload,
then copies one sockaddr_storage for every entry in transport_addr_list.
After the wrap, a diagnostic dump reserves an empty payload and writes
8 MiB of peer addresses past the skb tail.
Reject a new unique peer when transport_count has reached U16_MAX. Perform
the check after the existing-peer lookup so a duplicate address continues
to return its existing transport at the limit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev()
ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into
ub->dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses
->state and ->ublksrv_pid.
A device added with ->state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the
"->state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its
proxy for "a disk is attached", while ->ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV
right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus
UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A
poisoned ->state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device
read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV
at -EEXIST. A poisoned ->ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an
unrelated task as the ublk server.
Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only
ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing.
ADD_DEV has copied ->state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back
then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both
teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than
->state. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to
START_DEV and those checks switched to ->state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: use the subframe length when parsing A-MSDU TDLS frames
mwifiex_11n_dispatch_amsdu_pkt() splits an A-MSDU with
ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s() and walks the resulting subframes. For each
subframe it passes the subframe data pointer to
mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame(), but pairs it with skb->len, the
length of the A-MSDU parent, instead of rx_skb->len:
rx_skb = __skb_dequeue(&list);
rx_hdr = (struct rx_packet_hdr *)rx_skb->data;
if (ISSUPP_TDLS_ENABLED(priv->adapter->fw_cap_info) &&
ntohs(rx_hdr->eth803_hdr.h_proto) == ETH_P_TDLS) {
mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame(priv, (u8 *)rx_hdr,
skb->len);
}
The parent is not a valid description of that buffer, and may not be
valid memory at all. ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s() ends with
if (!reuse_skb)
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
and it only sets reuse_skb when the parent is linear, is not a
head_frag, and is being consumed as the *last* subframe. So when the
parent does not qualify for reuse it has already been freed, and the
read of skb->len is a use-after-free. When it is reused, skb->len is
the length of the last subframe, applied to every earlier subframe,
which over-states the buffer whenever an earlier subframe is shorter.
The callee cannot absorb a wrong length, because it derives its own
ceiling from the value it is given. Each frame type computes
ies_len = len - sizeof(struct ethhdr) - TDLS_*_FIX_LEN;
and the element walk is then bounded entirely against that ceiling,
for (end = pos + ies_len; pos + 1 < end; pos += 2 + pos[1]) {
u8 ie_len = pos[1];
if (pos + 2 + ie_len > end)
break;
so a too-large len moves end past the end of the subframe and the walk
reads and copies beyond it. The A-MSDU layout is chosen by the sender,
which makes the difference between the last subframe and a shorter
earlier one remotely selectable. Reaching this requires TDLS support in
firmware and the TDLS ethertype on the subframe.
The other caller, mwifiex_process_rx_packet(), is correct: it passes a
pointer and a length that describe the same region of the RX buffer.
Pass rx_skb->len, the length of the subframe actually being parsed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp - Fix snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions() off-by-one
Sashiko notes:
> regarding the bounds check in snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions()
> called via walk_iomem_res_desc(): does the check
> if ((range_list->num_elements * 16 + 8) > PAGE_SIZE)
> allow an off-by-one heap buffer overflow?
>
> If range_list->num_elements is 255, 255 * 16 + 8 = 4088, which is <= 4096.
> Writing range->base (8 bytes) fills 4088-4095, but writing range->page_count
> (4 bytes) would write to 4096-4099, overflowing the kzalloc-allocated
> PAGE_SIZE buffer.
Fix this by accounting for the entry about to be written to, in addition to
the entries that are already allocated. |
