| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw has been found in sambitraj Student-Management-System up to 56ba287f2e9031523ccb4244cb6e3fe530e4e5d5. This affects an unknown part of the component Management Mutation Handler. This manipulation of the argument roll_no/name/father_name/class/mobile/email/password/remark causes sql injection. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. This product adopts a rolling release strategy to maintain continuous delivery. Therefore, version details for affected or updated releases cannot be specified. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| A vulnerability was detected in sambitraj Student-Management-System up to 56ba287f2e9031523ccb4244cb6e3fe530e4e5d5. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the component Dashboard. The manipulation of the argument roll_no/teacher_name results in sql injection. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. This product implements a rolling release for ongoing delivery, which means version information for affected or updated releases is unavailable. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in SourceCodester Class and Exam Timetabling System 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /BSIT2.php. The manipulation of the argument course leads to cross site scripting. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. |
| The PPWP – Password Protect Pages plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.18 via deserialization of untrusted input from the 'post_protection_roles' vulnerable parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject a PHP Object. No known POP chain is present in the vulnerable software, which means this vulnerability has no impact unless another plugin or theme containing a POP chain is installed on the site. If a POP chain is present via an additional plugin or theme installed on the target system, it may allow the attacker to perform actions like delete arbitrary files, retrieve sensitive data, or execute code depending on the POP chain present. |
| A weakness has been identified in SourceCodester Class and Exam Timetabling System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /BSIS1.php. Executing a manipulation of the argument course can lead to cross site scripting. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. |
| A vulnerability was determined in alexta69 MeTube up to 2026.06.10. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /download/.metube/cookies.txt of the component Cookie File Handler. This manipulation causes files or directories accessible. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. Upgrading to version 2026.06.20 is sufficient to resolve this issue. Patch name: ce897ee00903bf7ded406f0d7852d95dd4164add. You should upgrade the affected component. |
| A vulnerability was found in Comfast CF-N1-S 2.6.0.1. The affected element is the function sub_41AD7C of the file /cgi-bin/mbox-config?method=SET§ion=ntp_timezone of the component Web Management. The manipulation of the argument timestr/ntp_client_enabled results in stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: ipheth: fix carrier_work UAF on disconnect
ipheth_sndbulk_callback() re-arms the carrier-check work on any
non-zero URB status:
else
schedule_delayed_work(&dev->carrier_work, 0);
Nothing ties that to the interface being up, so the work can be armed
again after ipheth_close() has already drained it, and stay armed
until the netdev whose private area embeds it is freed.
On unplug with a TX URB in flight, ipheth_disconnect() drains the work
through unregister_netdev() -> ipheth_close() ->
cancel_delayed_work_sync() and only then calls ipheth_kill_urbs().
usb_kill_urb() completes the in-flight TX URB with -ENOENT, so
ipheth_sndbulk_callback() runs after the drain and re-arms
carrier_work.
The same completion also re-arms the work if the interface is only
brought down while a TX URB is in flight, and
ipheth_carrier_check_work() then keeps re-queueing itself once a
second. unregister_netdev() does not call ipheth_close() for an
already-down interface, so nothing drains it on the later unplug
either.
In both cases free_netdev() frees the netdev while carrier_work is
still pending, and ipheth_carrier_check_work() dereferences freed
memory.
Tie the work to the interface state instead of chasing the completion:
disable it in ipheth_close() and enable it in ipheth_open(), so a
schedule_delayed_work() from the URB completion is a no-op whenever
the interface is not up. disable_delayed_work_sync() also waits for a
running instance, so it fully replaces the cancel_delayed_work_sync()
it takes the place of. The work starts out disabled in ipheth_probe()
so the enable/disable counts balance from the first open.
Reproduced under KASAN on linux-next (next-20260731) with dummy_hcd and
raw-gadget standing in for the device, driving the second path above (the
interface is already down, so unregister_netdev() does not call
ipheth_close()): 15 of 15 unpatched boots report a slab-use-after-free in
__run_timers(), freed by ipheth_disconnect() and re-armed from
ipheth_sndbulk_callback() via queue_delayed_work_on(). The
same trigger on a kernel differing only by this patch reports 0 of 15,
and the carrier check still functions across open/close cycles.
The reproducer needs an attached USB device that stops draining bulk OUT,
plus a link down and unplug, driven as root. It is not a privilege
boundary crossing and no exploit primitive was developed.
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: skip rehash for peers already removed from by_id
ovpn_nl_peer_set_doit() resolves the target peer via
ovpn_peer_get_by_id() before taking ovpn->lock. In the window between
the lookup (which only takes a refcount) and the subsequent
spin_lock_bh(&ovpn->lock), a concurrent OVPN_CMD_PEER_DEL, keepalive
expiry, or socket teardown can take ovpn->lock first, run
ovpn_peer_remove() to unhash the peer from all four tables (by_id,
by_vpn_addr4/6, by_transp_addr) and release the lock. set_doit then
acquires ovpn->lock and calls ovpn_peer_hash_vpn_ip(), which
re-inserts the now-removed peer back into the rehashing tables.
The same race affects the float path: ovpn_peer_endpoints_update()
holds only a refcount and acquires ovpn->lock very late (after async
AEAD decrypt and a netlink notification), then rehashes the peer
in the by_transp_addr table.
The resurrected peer becomes reachable again from the RX lookup
(ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr) and the TX VPN-IP lookup, even though
userspace believes it is gone. Once the data-path refcount drops the
peer is freed via call_rcu while the hash entries embedded in it
remain linked, opening a UAF window.
Bail out of the rehash when hash_entry_id is unhashed, mirroring
the sentinel already used by ovpn_peer_remove() to detect the
already-removed state. The check is safe under ovpn->lock, which
serializes every mutation of hash_entry_id, and is a no-op for the
add path because ovpn_peer_add_mp() inserts hash_entry_id before
calling ovpn_peer_hash_vpn_ip(). |
| The Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver's transmit callback airoc_mgmt_send() in drivers/wifi/infineon/airoc_wifi.c allocates a net_buf from the fixed airoc_pool for every outbound packet. When whd_network_send_ethernet_data() returns a synchronous failure, the underlying WHD library does not take ownership of the buffer, but the pre-fix driver returned -EIO without releasing it. Each failed transmit therefore permanently leaks one buffer from the pool.
airoc_pool is small and fixed (AIROC_WIFI_TX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT + AIROC_WIFI_RX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT, default 20 buffers) and is shared by WHD's whd_host_buffer_get callback for both transmit and receive. Once enough send failures have leaked the pool dry, airoc_wifi_host_buffer_get() returns WHD_BUFFER_ALLOC_FAIL for all subsequent allocations, so both transmit and the WHD-driven receive path fail and Wi-Fi connectivity is lost until the device is rebooted.
The leak occurs only on the transmit error path. A Wi-Fi-adjacent attacker can influence the conditions that cause synchronous send failures (for example by deauthenticating/disassociating the station while the local stack continues to attempt transmits), and ordinary transient failures over the device's lifetime accumulate toward the same state. Reliable on-demand triggering is of high complexity and the impact is availability-only, but the resulting denial of service is permanent and non-recoverable without a reboot.
The fix releases the buffer with airoc_wifi_buffer_release() on the failure branch, returning it to the pool. The commit also removes a redundant k_sem_give() in airoc_mgmt_disconnect(); because data->sema_common is a binary semaphore (limit 1) the duplicate give merely saturated at 1 and had no security impact. |
| A vulnerability has been found in Systerel S2OPC up to 1.7.3. Impacted is the function SOPC_NodeMgtHelperInternal_AddVariableNodeAttributes of the file src/ClientServer/address_space/internal/sopc_node_mgt_helper_internal.c of the component AddNodes Service. The manipulation of the argument UserAccessLevel leads to out-of-bounds read. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. A high degree of complexity is needed for the attack. The exploitability is considered difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of the patch is aafbd37d381b618312ebdf5ddf57027f62c14fdd. It is suggested to install a patch to address this issue. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs
The opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared
map value. __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() and __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry() read
opts->netns_id separately when acquiring and releasing the network
namespace reference.
The reference imbalance can occur as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
read opts->netns_id (-1)
skip get_net_ns_by_id()
write opts->netns_id (id)
read opts->netns_id (id)
put_net(net) /* no matching get */
The reverse transition leaks the reference. Repeating the unmatched put
can destroy a live namespace and crash later users.
The kernel reported:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef]
RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700
Call Trace:
__sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0
__x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Snapshot every input field of opts with READ_ONCE() before validating or
using it. The netns_id snapshot keeps the namespace get/put pair
balanced, while the other snapshots keep the remaining options from
changing partway through an invocation. The individual reads can still
observe an inconsistent combination during a concurrent update, but each
selected field value remains stable for that invocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc: aspeed: lpc-snoop: Fix usercopy overflow in snoop_file_read
put_fifo_with_discard() acts as both producer and consumer on the kfifo:
it calls kfifo_skip() (advances out) and kfifo_put() (advances in) from
the IRQ handler without synchronizing with snoop_file_read(), which also
consumes via kfifo_to_user(). On SMP systems this concurrent access can
leave (in - out) larger than the ring buffer, so __kfifo_to_user()'s clamp
to (in - out) is ineffective and kfifo_copy_to_user() can attempt a
copy_to_user() past the kmalloc-2k backing store:
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object
'kmalloc-2k' (offset 0, size 2049)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c!
Call trace:
usercopy_abort
__check_heap_object
__check_object_size
kfifo_copy_to_user
__kfifo_to_user
snoop_file_read
vfs_read
Serialize kfifo access with a per-channel spinlock shared between the
IRQ handler (producer) and the file reader (consumer). Annotate @fifo
with __guarded_by(&lock) and opt the driver into context analysis so the
compiler enforces that all fifo access holds the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: stabilize tty reference in kbd_keycode with tty_port_tty_get
kbd_keycode() reads vc->port.tty without acquiring a tty reference,
racing against con_shutdown() which clears port.tty under a different
lock. Use tty_port_tty_get()/tty_kref_put() to hold a proper reference
for the duration the tty pointer is needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: fw_tracer, return NULL on create error
Tracer creation can fail by returning either NULL or ERR_PTR.
The return value is stored without a check on the device, and users
treat ERR_PTR and NULL the same way.
This also causes a crash in the core dump logic, which is missing the
ERR_PTR check and ends up dereferencing it, as shown in the trace below.
Switch tracer creation to return NULL on failure only, so callers only
need a single NULL check.
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core ipv6 mlx5_core
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 6.19.7 #1 PREEMPT(none)
Workqueue: mlx5_health0001:01:00.0 mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]
pstate: a3400009 (NzCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : mlx5_fw_tracer_trigger_core_dump_general+0x58/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
lr : mlx5_fw_tracer_trigger_core_dump_general+0x40/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
sp : ffff800081cf3c40
x29: ffff800081cf3c90 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffff000080018828 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff000080304a05
x23: ffff800081cf3d80 x22: ffff0000847e01a0 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff0000847e01a0 x19: ffffffffffffffa1 x18: ffff80008310bbf0
x17: ffff800080119650 x16: ffff80008010df54 x15: ffff80008010d4ac
x14: ffff800079c202e4 x13: ffff80008002fe60 x12: ffff800080119650
x11: ffff80008010df54 x10: ffff80008010d4ac x9 : ffff800079c203d8
x8 : ffff800081cf3c88 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000008 x3 : 0000000000000030
x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000c5c4000e
Call trace:
mlx5_fw_tracer_trigger_core_dump_general+0x58/0xe0 [mlx5_core] (P)
mlx5_fw_reporter_dump+0x30/0x2e0 [mlx5_core]
devlink_health_do_dump+0x9c/0x160
devlink_health_report+0x1c0/0x288
mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work+0xac/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x15c/0x3d8
worker_thread+0x18c/0x320
kthread+0x148/0x228
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Code: b9400000 5ac00800 7a401800 540003ca (3940a260)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
Kernel Offset: disabled
CPU features: 0x000000,00078031,75fce5a1,35fffe67
Memory Limit: none
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
packet: use consistent hard_header_len in TX_RING send path
tpacket_snd() reads dev->hard_header_len independently for skb
allocation and header construction in tpacket_fill_skb(). Concurrent
netdevice reconfiguration can therefore make the reserved headroom
smaller than the amount later pushed, or make copylen - hard_header_len
negative.
Snapshot hard_header_len once before processing ring frames and use it
for the frame limit, headroom allocation, copy length, and skb
construction. Pass the snapshot to tpacket_fill_skb().
The separate SOCK_DGRAM consistency problem between hard_header_len and
header_ops->create is not addressed here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa/mlx5: Fix buffer length in create_direct_keys()
We have seen in our CI the following KASAN message:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cmd_exec+0x550/0xca0 [mlx5_core]
Read of size 272 at addr 0000000176795020 by task qemu-system-s39/82764
[...]
[<000011388ab3a7a0>] cmd_exec+0x550/0xca0 [mlx5_core]
[<000011388ab3b61c>] mlx5_cmd_exec_cb+0x25c/0x4f0 [mlx5_core]
[<000011388b21e82e>] mlx5_vdpa_exec_async_cmds+0x22e/0x5e0 [mlx5_vdpa]
[<000011388b21fd44>] create_direct_keys+0x954/0xef0 [mlx5_vdpa]
[...]
The buggy address is located 4128 bytes inside of
allocated 4384-byte region [0000000176794000, 0000000176795120)
So in essence we read 16 bytes beyond 4384-byte allocation.
create_direct_keys calculates the pointer and length for in and out
buffers.
The size calculation for in includes the entire structure
size (out + in + mtt[]) but the pointer passed to cmd_exec points only
to the 'in' field, skipping the 'out' field.
This causes mlx5_copy_to_msg() to read beyond the allocated buffer
by sizeof(out) bytes when copying command data.
Properly calculate the input size to match the pointer and allocation size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers
Another challenge with unlocked filters.
There is a short window in tc_new_tfilter where a tcf_proto can be found
and briefly referenced by a totally unrelated, unlocked classifier's request
and cause a race.
Feng created a poc which created this race with two threads, one creating a
u32 filter and other a flower filter in the same chain/prio:
1. Both threads enter tc_new_tfilter, both find the chain empty, both
drop filter_chain_lock
2. u32 finishes tcf_proto_create("u32") first, calls
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> inserts u32_tp into the chain
3. flower finishes tcf_proto_create("flower") later, calls
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() -> tcf_chain_tp_find() now sees u32_tp
already there, takes a reference on it, destroys flower's own tp_new
and returns u32_tp to the caller.
Flower then hits the kind mismatch check (because it requested for kind
"flower" but tp->ops->kind is "u32") and goes through the errout path
which calls tcf_proto_put() on u32_tp. If the u32 thread has already
gone through its own errout (its change() call failed on the PoC's empty
options) and dropped its create and insert refs, flower's put is the
last one and drops u32_tp's refcnt to zero.
At this point tp->ops->destroy() runs in a context that never took
rtnl_lock. When that happens, it might cause a UAF like the following
(illustrated by the PoC):
[ +0.000710] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393)
[ +0.000281] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120022f00 by task poc_feng_xue/524
Call Trace:
u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:393)
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378)
Allocated by task 526:
u32_init (net/sched/cls_u32.c:378)
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2378)
Freed by task 522:
kfree
u32_destroy (net/sched/cls_u32.c:662)
tcf_proto_destroy (net/sched/cls_api.c:446)
tcf_proto_put (net/sched/cls_api.c:459)
tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2459)
Fix this by having tcf_proto_destroy() take rtnl_lock around
tp->ops->destroy() for locked classifiers whenever rtnl is not held.
To explain why I used a temp variable "not_lockless" I'd like to point to a
semi-related note on rtnl_held vs TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED (adding here
for future cleanup if deemed necessary):
The rtnl_held parameter and the TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED flag are
redundant sources of truth for whether rtnl_lock is held. Among the nine
classifier destroy(..rtnl_held..) callbacks, only flower consults the
rtnl_held parameter which it propagates to tc_setup_cb_destroy()
and tc_setup_cb_call(). The other eight (u32, flow, bpf, cgroup, route, basic,
fw, mall) ignore it entirely;-> those that call tc_setup_cb_destroy()
(u32, bpf, mall) hardcode true always instead of forwarding the parameter.
A future cleanup should remove the rtnl_held parameter from the destroy callback
signature entirely and have callers rely solely on their knowledge whether
they are running in an unlocked context. |
