| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Reflected XSS in Netron versions <=9.1.2 on desktop application through unsanitized node names allows an attacker to hide certain nodes, perform port scanning or abuse a Chrome n-day to achieve Remote Code Execution. |
| Reflected XSS in Netron versions <=9.1.2 on desktop application through unsanitized node names allows an attacker to hide certain nodes, perform port scanning or abuse a Chrome n-day to achieve Remote Code Execution. |
| Pausing a shared (public) dashboard did not revoke its access token for the endpoints that serve frontend bootstrap data. Anyone holding the link to a paused shared dashboard could still retrieve, without authenticating, the configuration of the dashboard's data sources, including stored credentials for data sources using browser access (missing authorization). Deleting the shared dashboard does revoke the token. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: don't let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop
rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from
RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts
RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that
a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail
the shutdown into a noisy error path.
But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that
came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues
cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN
is a no-op. For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN
arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released. It is not
harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first.
rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper. Its path claim in
rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN ->
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous
socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path
into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that
follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR. The accept then installs the
freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued
teardown - which sampled tc->t_sock before this socket existed - is
still running. rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to
RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should
reap the socket it just installed. If the in-flight shutdown's final
transition consumes that drop's RDS_CONN_ERROR, the queued pass finds
the path in RDS_CONN_DOWN and does nothing. The installed socket is
never torn down: it sits established with its callbacks armed and its
rds_tcp_connection on rds_tcp_tc_list, the peer sees a connection that
nothing ever reads, and the path is wedged in RDS_CONN_DOWN until some
later event drops it again. Reproduced with widened race windows as
an ever-growing receive queue on a socket owned by a path stuck in
RDS_CONN_DOWN, with the peer's send path wedged behind it.
Make the final transition only DISCONNECTING -> DOWN. If it fails
because the path is in RDS_CONN_ERROR, a drop raced the teardown:
cancel the reconnect timer and clear RDS_RECONNECT_PENDING - the one
piece of the skipped tail that must not be left behind - and return,
letting the pass the drop queued finish the job: it tears down
whatever attached to the path in the meantime, completes the
transition to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and re-arms the reconnect from its own
tail.
The timer quiesce in that branch matters because the racing drop does
not always queue that pass: rds_conn_path_drop() returns without
queueing when a destroy is pending - exactly the situation during a
netns teardown or module unload, when a FIN on the dying socket is
processed while rds_conn_path_destroy() flushes cp_down_w. If the
flushed pass is the one that takes this return, no later pass exists,
and rds_conn_path_destroy() would find cp_conn_w still armed
(WARN_ON) and then free a path whose reconnect timer can still fire.
With the cancel in the branch, every exit of a shutdown pass leaves
the timer quiesced no matter which pass completes the transition.
The FIN case keeps making progress, one pass later and still without
noisy logging. Any other state keeps today's rds_conn_path_error()
handling; no current cp_state writer can leave a DISCONNECTING path
in anything but RDS_CONN_ERROR (every other writer is a cmpxchg from
a non-DISCONNECTING state), so that branch is defensive.
On kernels without the preceding patches the same hazard exists with
the sample-based quiesce; the fix applies there equally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()
rds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by
waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and
then runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling
the bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the
wait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or
rds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run
concurrently with the teardown.
The sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock,
but that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes
the state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads
the state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on
weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write,
and the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings
(e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the
transmit state under it.
Oracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of
BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL
dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing -
by making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead
of testing them ("rds: Make sure transmit path and connection
tear-down does not run concurrently"). Ownership of a single word is
decided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed.
Do the same here: take both locks before calling the transport
shutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them
explicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with
clear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the
transport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by
rds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by
the next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill().
The fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and
rds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown
owns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them.
rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it
acquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now
spans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter
runs from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue
and holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so
a duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks
accept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded
by the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB
path's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no
blocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking
acquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the
fastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB
drain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The
window is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the
teardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING.
Because krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued
there - accept processing for other connections and network
namespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop()
during namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for
that time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each
other: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and
the holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes
without needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels
rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on
the path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by
the blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel
without flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now
noted next to those cancels (on
---truncated--- |
| Use after free in Platform in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in HID in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted PDF file. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Buffer overflow in Video in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Type confusion in IndexedDB in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Views in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Improper input validation in Auth in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process and leveraged social engineering to obtain sensitive information via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| UI misrepresentation in FileSystem in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to spoof UI elements via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use after free in Verifier in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use of uninitialized variable in Tint in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to read memory outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Information leak in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Race condition in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass site isolation via a crafted Chrome extension. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Incorrect authorization in Scroll in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to obtain cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Information leak in Networking in Google Chrome prior to 154.0.8037.57 allowed a remote attacker to leak sensitive information via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
